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What Good is Abstraction? From Liberal
Legitimacy to Social Justice
NIMER SULTANY†
INTRODUCTION
The stakes could not be higher. Post-World War II
political and economic institutions are under unprecedented
pressure. The social coalitions that have sustained them are
crumbling. Welfare-state capitalism is in retreat, and liberal
institutions are besieged. Right-wing populists are
cementing their power and consolidating their grip on
political and legal institutions around the globe. In the
United States, President Donald Trump’s judicial
appointments, especially to the Supreme Court, are likely to
secure the ideological hegemony of the extreme Right-wing
for decades to come under the mantle of the rule of law. The
answer to these historical changes cannot be a return to the
very status quo that led to them in the first place. It cannot
be argued that what preceded the Right-wing populist wave
was a decent social order and well-functioning political
system. Instead of seeking a renewal of failed liberal
formulas that underpinned a broken political system, what
is urgently required is a theoretical comprehension of these
† Nimer Sultany is Senior Lecturer in Public Law at the School of Oriental and
African Studies, University of London. I thank Frank Michelman, Duncan
Kennedy, Abdel-Razzaq Takriti, and Paul O’Connell for helpful comments on
previous drafts.
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new realities in order to change them and prevent their
future iterations. The scale of these dramatic
transformations should be matched by theoretical
transformations.
In order to have real purchase, political theory and legal
theory need to provide adequate tools and frameworks for a
critical response to historical conditions of human existence.
The poverty of theory is an inadequate response to the
increase in inequality and concentrated poverty in wealthy
capitalist societies. This Article argues progressive liberal
theoretical frameworks are unfit for purpose. They betray a
loss of conviction and commitment to the very egalitarian
ideals that progressive liberals advocate for. Specifically, this
Article critiques abstraction as a mode of argumentation in
political and legal theory in which there is a retreat from
controversial political and moral territory to establish a
consensual political regime and binding legal order. It is not
a critique of abstraction—the unavoidable activity of
generalizing knowledge and forming concepts (including in
mathematics and art)—per se. Nor does it seek to engage in
metaphysical debates about “nominalism,” as in whether
abstract objects and universals exist. Rather, the method of
abstraction is endemic to political theory in order to establish
general conclusions and to “escape the tyranny of context.”1
The critique zeros in on a specific form of abstraction given
its rational failings and objectionable normative effects:
namely, the kind of legal-political orders it justifies. It is an
internal critique to liberal theory that illustrates that this
abstraction does not meet the theory’s own standards and
fails to achieve its declared objectives. This methodological
critique of abstraction is tied to a substantive critique of a
normatively objectionable standard of legitimacy to which
this form of abstraction leads.
The main family of theories that betray this lack of

1. Chandran Kukathas, Contextualism Reconsidered: Some Skeptical
Reflections, 7 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 215, 221–22 (2004).
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conviction is “political liberalism,” as developed by eminent
scholars such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. Political
liberalism draws a clear distinction between the ambitions of
liberal justice and the institutional commitments of liberal
legitimacy. While both Rawls and Dworkin claim that
advanced capitalist and liberal constitutionalist democracies
are unjust by the standards their own theories of liberal
justice stipulate, they still hold that these are nevertheless
legitimate political regimes and political economies. The
reason for this gap between liberal legitimacy and liberal
justice is abstraction, or proceduralization, in which there is
an attempt to narrow down disagreement to allow a
convergence over an agreed upon general structure of a
political regime amongst differently situated social actors.
This leads to an increasing thinning out of the pre-conditions
for the permissible exercise of coercive political power.
Consequently, progressive liberals allow as legitimate
policies and practices, such as welfare-state capitalism and
neo-liberalism, that are detrimental to the very goals that
they aspire to. Therefore, the egalitarian bark of progressive
liberal theory is louder than its egalitarian bite. Ultimately,
liberal legitimacy is not merely different from justice but it
also defers justice and legitimates injustice.
What is remarkable about all of this is that progressive
liberals pay a heavy price (retreating from their egalitarian
commitments) for something they cannot achieve (narrowing
down disagreement to allow for a consensual mode of
governance). The abandonment of progressive ambitions to
the elusive tranquility of the center betrays an irrational
hope because the center cannot hold: it is neither stable nor
static.
Another way to describe this family of political liberalism
is that of “liberalism of fear.”2 This conception of liberalism
2. Judith N. Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL
LIFE 21 passim (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989). Rawls himself refers to Shklar’s
article as part of the family of political liberalism. John Rawls, Political
Liberalism: Reply to Habermas, 92 J. PHIL. 132, 133 n.1 (1995).
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emphasizes the deep suspicion of the state and fear from the
abuse of political power; it puts “cruelty and fanaticism at
the very head of the human vices.”3 Judith Shklar seeks a
freestanding
liberalism
that
avoids
unnecessary
4
controversial intellectual territory. Thus, liberalism can be
compatible with a wide range of traditions and religions.5
This liberalism is exclusively oriented to the political
sphere.6 Following Shklar, András Sajó conceptualizes
liberal constitutionalism as a “constitutionalism of fear.”7
But this fear of commitment to progressive ideals ends
up producing that which is feared. For example, Rawls’
egalitarianism is evident in his rejection of laissez-faire
capitalism (because it only guarantees formal equality with
a low social minimum) and of welfare-state capitalism
(because it allows the concentration of wealth and power in
the hands of the few and creates a permanent welfaredependent underclass).8 Thus, Rawlsian justice requires the
“fair value of political liberties” to prevent the corrupting
influence of wealth on the political system, it requires
egalitarianism that benefits the least advantaged in society,
and it seeks guarantees against the formality of rights by
requiring a fair equality of opportunity in access to positions
and offices. Yet, Rawlsian legitimacy allows as legitimate a
large part of that which liberal justice condemns because
these are excluded from the “constitutional essentials.”9
Liberal constitutionalism thereby abandons citizens to anti-

3. Shklar, supra note 2, at 23; see also JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES
7–44 (1984).
4. Shklar, supra note 2, at 24.
5. Id. at 26.
6. Id. at 31.
7. ANDRÁS SAJÓ, CONSTITUTIONAL SENTIMENTS 115–133 (2011). For an earlier
version of this argument, see ANDRÁS SAJÓ, LIMITING GOVERNMENT: AN
INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONALISM (1999).
8. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 135–40 (Erin Kelly
ed., 2001).
9. See discussion infra Part I.
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egalitarian, neo-liberal policies such as deregulation,
privatization, commodification, and taxation schemes that
privilege the rich. This is an unjust political economy that
distributes wealth upwards to the upper classes, creates
huge disparities in wealth and power, impoverishes citizens
and dislocates them, and destroys the social fabric in ways
that make the citizenry amenable to the siren calls of false
prophets.10
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I sketches
political liberalism’s double-move in which prominent
scholars like Rawls and Dworkin increasingly abstract from
moral and political disagreement by proceduralizing moral
and political conflict. This proceduralization leads to the
thinning out of the basis for political authority and at the
same time it imposes limits on the politics of progressive
justice. Part II argues this argumentative move is futile and
hence its consequences are not warranted. This is because
the legitimacy standards that political liberals proffer
(Rawls’ “constitutional essentials” and Dworkin’s “integrity”)
are no less controversial than the substantive disagreements
over justice they seek to circumvent. Using the example of
the liberal commitment to neutrality in institutional design,
Part II further illustrates that constraints on politics are
controversial and contingent. Neutrality is incoherent
because it mandates contradictory outcomes. Ultimately, it
is either too thin to secure progressive objectives, or too thick
to be consensual. Part III highlights the objectionable nature
of this abstraction and responds to potential objections to the
argument. It argues abstraction is not merely futile but also
leads to objectionable consequences that undermine the very
ambitions and prospects of liberal justice.
I. THE DOUBLE-MOVE OF LIBERAL THEORY AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
A dominant approach in liberalism employs a two-fold
10. See generally DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEO-LIBERALISM (2005).
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move: from the good to justice (since liberalism permits and
encourages disagreement over the good and does not want to
determine for citizens what ways of life they want to lead)
and from justice to legitimacy (since liberal scholars realize
disagreements over justice should also be taken seriously but
nonetheless can be contained in normative conceptions of
legitimacy).
The purpose of this exercise is to show that, first, this
theoretical justificatory movement leads to an increasing
thinning out of the conception of the socio-political order;
second, the alleged objective for this thinning out is
circumventing disagreement in order to provide a solid basis
for legal and political ordering; but, third, this objective fails
in every step. The more disagreement is recognized, the
thinner the conception of the political order becomes. The
outcome of this process is a considerably thin political and
legal ordering without an acceptable conception of legitimacy
that can attract the necessary wide allegiance. Finally, this
movement is detrimental for the kind of politics that may be
pursued within the liberal political order.
A. From the Good to Justice
The ethical question of “the good life” is concerned with
the particular pursuit of a way of life according to one’s
ordering of values and one’s desired or preferred ends.
Liberal “justice,” on the other hand, is concerned with the
pursuit of norms or general moral rules that are right for
everyone and can regulate people’s conduct as well as their
interactions and relations with each other. The relation
between the good life and liberal justice requires a
consideration of the move from “comprehensive liberalism”
(that presupposes a societal agreement over the good) to
“political liberalism” (that presupposes an irreconcilable
disagreement over the good). This move suggests the defense
of liberal justice cannot be too liberal (and thus
comprehensive). Rather, it should be defended on the basis
of the thinnest justification possible (political liberalism). It
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therefore becomes possible for it to be endorsed by a widerange of views and ways of life including non-liberal ones.
1. Rawls: From Comprehensive Liberalism To Political
Liberalism
Rawls argues the liberal theory of justice as fairness is a
“deontological
theory.”11
Accordingly,
and
unlike
“teleological theories”: “something is good if it fits into ways
of life consistent with the principles of right already on
hand.”12 The priority of justice over the good does not mean
that a theory of justice is innocent of any ideas of the good in
its justificatory exercise. Rather, Rawls distinguishes
between the “thin” theory of the good and the “full” theory of
the good. The principles of justice presuppose the thin
theory, which seeks “to secure the premises about primary
goods required to arrive at the principles of justice.”13 The
primary goods are those goods that any rational person
would like to maximize as a means to advance her specific
ends regardless of her full conception of the good.14 Primary
goods would include liberties, rights, income, and the social
bases of self-respect.15
Despite the thinness and universality of the “thin theory
of the good,” Rawls’ is a “comprehensive theory” in A Theory
of Justice. This theory is comprehensive both because “it
appeals to moral values in addition to justice (full autonomy,
the good of community)” and because “it invokes
philosophical accounts of the nature of agency and of
practical reason, of moral objectivity, moral justification, and
moral truth.”16 It is this baggage that the move to “political

11. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 26 (23d prtg. 1999).
12. Id. at 396.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 62, 395–99.
15. Id. at 90–95.
16. SAMUEL FREEMAN, RAWLS 325 (2007). It is a matter of debate whether
Rawls is correct in his assessment of his earlier work as being comprehensive or

830

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

liberalism” seeks to put aside since it makes the theory of
justice more controversial than it should be and is required
for justifying the political order.
In Political Liberalism Rawls revises the relationship
between the good and justice by distinguishing between
“political” conceptions of justice and “reasonable
comprehensive doctrines.”17 Now he claims that it is not
enough for justice as fairness to be a deontological theory
that prioritizes justice over the good. Justice should not be
grounded in any controversial ethical foundations that might
be rejected by reasonable comprehensive doctrines.18 In
order to secure stability for the theory of justice it needs to
be ethically “freestanding”—justified independently of any
conception of the good—so it can be adhered to by a variety
of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.19 The justification for
the principles of justice that will regulate the well-ordered
society should be cleansed from any metaphysical or ethical
frameworks, specifically those that are not shared by the
non-liberal and non-secular. It should neither affirm nor
deny controversial ethical propositions.20 In other words, it
needs to be “political” (or “procedural”): invokes political
notions only, addresses the political domain (concerned with
the “basic structure”—the primary political, social and
economic institutions in society—as opposed to the
“background culture” of civil society), and regulates political
conflict. The grounds for this political justification are to be
found in “latent” or “implicit” ideas in the already existing
partially comprehensive. See, e.g., Roberto Alejandro, What is Political About
Rawls’s Political Liberalism, 58 J. POLITICS 1, 15–16 (1996); Brian Barry, John
Rawls and the Search for Stability, 105 ETHICS 874, 876–80 (1995). This
discussion is beside the point for my concerns. The main objective is to show that
Rawls makes certain theoretical moves given his own assessment of his own work
and of liberalism’s possibility to gain normative acceptability in the political
world. And that this movement increases the thinness of the theory.
17. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 10–15, 59–60 (expanded ed., 2005).
18. See Barry, supra note 16, at 890.
19. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 10, 12.
20. Id. at xix–xx.
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“public political culture of a democratic society.”21 By
clarifying “widely shared” ideas, Rawls hopes to avoid the
deployment of a wide-ranging philosophical defense of these
ideas.22 Comprehensive doctrines, on the other hand, reside
in the background culture, “the culture of the social, not of
the publicly political. It is the culture of daily life.”23
The move to political liberalism creates a bifurcation in
the justificatory edifice of liberalism between the citizen and
the person in general: that is, between political public
justifications deployed by (and addressed to) the citizen and
comprehensive justifications deployed in the non-political
sphere (background culture) and addressed to the individual
in her non-political capacity.24 Whereas in comprehensive
liberalism the main unit is the person in general, in political
liberalism the main unit is the person’s capacity as a citizen;
whereas comprehensive liberalism seeks full moral
autonomy that refers to systems of values, political
liberalism seeks a more limited grounding of political
autonomy.25 This differentiation is a distinctively liberal
position and by no means limited to Rawls.26 Political
liberalism, then, involves a “division of the moral territory”
between political theory and personal morality, and
egalitarianism is required in the design of collective
institutions but not as a matter of personal ethics and
individual conduct.27
Following this change, it would seem that justice is
detached even further from the good. The foundational

21. Id. at 13, 175.
22. FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 331–32.
23. Rawls, supra note 2, at 140.
24. RAWLS, supra note 17, at xxi (calling it “dualism”).
25. Id. at xlii–xliii, 29–35, and 99–101.
26. See, e.g., Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 339, 351–
53 (1990).
27. Thomas Nagel, Rawls and Liberalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
RAWLS 62, 82 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).
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justification for justice now rests on narrower grounds.
Rawls claims his earlier work invoked partially
comprehensive ideas and it assumed that “in the wellordered society of justice as fairness, citizens hold the same
comprehensive doctrine,” but these assumptions are now
cast away.28 Thus, this version of liberalism claims to be
more accommodationist of a variety of ways of life than
comprehensive liberalism,29 for it claims to be sidestepping
many ethical-moral questions.30
2. Dworkin: From
Political Liberalism

Comprehensive

Liberalism

To

Dworkin presents in Sovereign Virtue a self-declared
ethical and comprehensive liberalism.31 Dworkin advocates
a conception of the good society and the virtues it encourages
among its citizens (such as leading imaginative lives or
reflective judgment as in the “challenge model” and
responsibility of members not to lead wasted lives).32 In this
conception of justice, Dworkin obscures the line between
ethics and political philosophy. This, some scholars have
suggested, collapses the distinction between the right and
the good and substitutes the deontological character of the
theory for the ethical.33 Yet, it is more accurate to say that
28. RAWLS, supra note 17, at xl, 99–101.
29. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Perfectionist Liberalism and Political
Liberalism, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (2011) (endorsing political liberalism since it
is “superior” to perfectionist liberalism, like the one advocated by Isaiah Berlin
and Joseph Raz, which is a comprehensive doctrine).
30. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 360–61
(1980).
31. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EQUALITY 4–5 (2000) [hereinafter DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE]. Dworkin
presents a more systematized account in his book: RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR
HEDGEHOGS (2011) [hereinafter DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS].
32. DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 31, at 238–40.
33. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTION TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 63 (William Rehg trans., paperback
ed. 1998); BERNARD WILLIAMS, IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE DEED: REALISM AND
MORALISM IN POLITICAL ARGUMENT 10 n.5 (Geoffrey Hawthorn ed., 2005).
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the theory is still deontological (the right is prior to the good)
even though it is comprehensive (the right is grounded in and
supported by the good, and the good of living well is supposed
to be shared). Dworkin’s attempt to find an “ethical basis for
morality” and “unite ethics and morality”34 neither
relinquishes the universal character of morality nor follows
classical teleological theories into embedding it in a specific
social structure.35 That is, encouraging the virtue of living
well is not meant to advance a particular conception of the
good, nor is it necessarily to be maximized.36
Dworkin’s attempt suggests, for the later Rawls, a
comprehensive doctrine that cannot be a basis for coercive
political and legal ordering under conditions of ethical
disagreement.37 Indeed, Dworkin’s writings about the
justification for coercive power in Law’s Empire present a
decidedly political liberal view of justice. Here, justice
becomes one ideal among other important ideals like
fairness, integrity, and due process. Like Rawls’ Political
Liberalism which idealizes fundamental ideas found in the
tradition and practice of democracies in order to ground the
theory of justice in acceptable roots, Dworkin looks at the
history and practice of the community understood as a moral
community of principle in order to distill the meaning of, and
provide the foundations for, justice. Rather than grounding
it in a comprehensive conception of a wide-ranging
philosophical system—as he does in Sovereign Virtue as well
as Justice for Hedgehogs—he grounds it in Law’s Empire
within the community as an internal concept to the practice.
Justice, Dworkin writes, “is an institution we
interpret.”38 To discover the truth about justice, namely,

34. Ronald Dworkin, What is a Good Life?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 10, 2011,
passim.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 211 n.42.
38. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 73 (1986).
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what are the true statements or requirements of justice, one
needs first to examine the existing “paradigms” (the
competing historical practices and interpretations). In other
words, one posits tentative assumptions in the preinterpretive stage and then makes judgments about what
justice really is in the post-interpretive stages. One could
arrive at the conclusion that some theories of justice are
actually a “mistake”: they are not theories of justice at all.
Accordingly, theories of justice that radically diverge from
and
challenge
the
contemporary
paradigmatic
understanding of justice, like Nietzsche’s or Marx’s, are
examples of such mistakes.39
Part of the constructive interpretive process is to
delineate the independence and interdependence between
one social practice (e.g., justice) and other social practices
(e.g., law, fairness). In order to uncover the difference one
asks what is the point of justice, fairness, or law and what
interest or purpose do they serve. In addition, the
requirements of the social practice are “sensitive to its point”
and thus they “are not necessarily or exclusively what they
have always been taken to be.” Therefore, we “impose
meaning on the institution [of justice]—to see it in its best
light—and then to restructure it in the light of that
meaning.”40
The broad lines of Dworkin’s political theory of
interpretation can be stated in the following brief terms: the
best interpretation of a community—as well as law—is one
that is organized and guided by integrity in principle. 41 The
best interpretation of integrity is one of a single, coherent,
principled common scheme of justice (as opposed to
disparate,
arbitrary,
pragmatic,
and
inconsistent
applications).42 The best interpretation of justice is neither
39. Id. at 75.
40. Id. at 47 (emphasis in original).
41. Id. at 214.
42. Id. at 178, 219.
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based on majority sentiments nor on social conventions,
rather, it centralizes equal respect and concern. 43 The best
interpretation of equality is that of equality of resources.44
Elsewhere, Dworkin argues the political regime should
be impartial towards the conceptions of the good held, or
ways of life pursued, by the citizenry. This is a basic
assumption of the liberal theory of equality, or liberalism’s
“constitutive political morality,” in making political
decisions.45 He also insists, like Rawls,46 that liberalism
“does not rest on any special theory of personality.”47
B. From Justice to Legitimacy
It is within the political conception of liberal justice,
rather than the ethical or comprehensive conception, that
the contemporary liberal question of legitimacy is raised.
And it is this conception that best represents the alleged
break between Enlightenment liberalism and postEnlightenment liberalism, given the heightened awareness
that reason does not lead to moral and political consensus.48
Indeed, political authority—for many leading contemporary
liberal scholars—is based neither on the good nor on justice
but on legitimacy.
1. Rawls
A “political conception must be practicable,” it needs to
“fall under the art of the possible.”49 There is no practical use
for a political conception of justice if it is not stable. On the

43. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 214–20 (9th prtg. 2000).
44. DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 297–98.
45. DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 190–92.
46. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 26–27.
47. DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 203. See also DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 440–
41.
48. See, e.g., GERALD F. GAUS, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF LIBERALISM 1–22
(2003).
49. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 185.
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one hand, there is a range of just regimes but not all of them
are stable. On the other hand, there is a range of stable
regimes but not all of them are just. Thus, Rawls argues that
stability needs to be for the “right reasons.” It is a quest for
normative stability of just regimes (the regime would provide
reasonable citizens with good reasons for compliance) rather
than mere sociological acceptance. The mission of Political
Liberalism is to theorize when this can be achieved.
Previously, stability in A Theory of Justice is achieved
because there is a consensus over justice as fairness as true.
Not everyone, however, will accept Rawls’ own ethical,
Kantian justification for his theory of justice in A Theory of
Justice given the fact of reasonable pluralism (the existence
of irreconcilable ethical differences) and the burdens of
judgment (that reason leads to disagreement even amongst
the reasonable). Not everyone who is reasonable is a liberal
and not everyone who is reasonable will accept that moral
autonomy is an intrinsic good.50 Furthermore, there is a
disagreement even amongst liberals both on how liberal
justice should be justified and what it requires (Kant and
Mill, for instance). Hence for Political Liberalism, justice as
fairness is merely one of several possible liberal political
theories of justice, though arguably it is the most reasonable
of them.51 For justice as fairness to be the most reasonable it
should prove that it is the most stable theory of justice—this
can be achieved by its political nature that guarantees the
widest endorsement despite reasonable disagreement.
Stability would be guaranteed for three reasons: the basic
structure would be regulated by justice as fairness; there will
be an “overlapping consensus” endorsing justice as fairness
given its political nature; and “public reason” mirrors the
political nature of the theory of justice in that public debates
by officials, legislatures, voters, and judges concerning
fundamental questions of justice would invoke political

50. FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 319–22.
51. RAWLS, supra note 17, at xlvi–xlvii, 226–27.
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terms and reasons.52
The emphasis in political liberalism, then, moves from
the “true” to the “reasonable.”53 The required consent for
Rawls, however, is hypothetical rather than actual. Rawls is
concerned with a theory of normative legitimacy as opposed
to a sociological Weberian conception of legitimacy.54 Rawls,
not unlike other scholars like Habermas, rejects Weberian
legitimacy.55 The latter is an empiricist theory assessing
sociological acceptance, while theories developed by Rawls
and Habermas are reconstructive theories assessing the
acceptability of the legal and political order by virtue of “good
reasons” that are derived from “hypothetical contract” or
“ideal speech” situations. Whereas the organizing concept for
Weberian theory is belief, Rawls and Habermas prioritize
reason. Weber’s legitimation question is how acceptance
happens and why the regime is held to be legitimate, Rawls
and Habermas ask how the regime can be acceptable (what
conditions it needs to meet to be acceptable).56
Accordingly, the theory stipulates the conditions under
which the exercise of coercive power is legitimate
(acceptable; morally justifiable) even though some citizens
might consider this exercise unjust.57 According to the

52. Id. at 44.
53. Id. at xx; JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 17, at 441 passim.
54. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY 31–38, 212–15 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim
Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1968).
55. For Habermas’ discussion of Weber’s legitimation, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS,
LEGITIMATION CRISIS 95–102 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975). See HABERMAS,
supra note 33, at 107, for a discussion of Habermas’ principle of legitimacy, or
normative validity.
56. For a critique of the Weberian model of legitimacy, compare Alan Hyde,
The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 379
passim, with David O. Friedrichs, The Concept of Legitimation and the Legal
Order: A Response to Hyde’s Critique, 3 JUST. Q. 33 passim (1986).
57. Burton Dreben, On Rawls and Political Liberalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO RAWLS, supra note 27, at 316, 317.
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Rawlsian “liberal principle of legitimacy,” which “reflects the
abiding moral heart of liberal thought”58:
our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials
of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the
light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and
rational.59

An individual would accept the coercion of a legitimate
system if there is (a) universal reasonable and rational
acceptability and (b) general compliance by fellow citizens,
(c) so long as the system is not too unjust.60 There are five
important points here.
First, the content of the theory of justice to which the
“constitutional essentials” should conform does not change.
The principles of justice and the lexical ordering (the priority
of the political liberties over equality) between them is the
same in both books. The main change is in the form of
justification and the account of stability it gives rise to.
Rawls claims that this means the same egalitarianism is
preserved in the move from comprehensive to political
liberalism.61
Second, for reasonable citizens, the idea of legitimacy is
directed at the general structure of political authority (as
represented by the constitution) and not at specific laws
since they know that unanimity is impossible.62 Thus, so long
as statutes are enacted by a legitimate regime (that abides
by the “constitutional essentials” according to some
interpretation of these essentials that falls within the
58. Charles Larmore, The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism, 96 J. PHIL. 599,
605–06 (1999).
59. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 217. See id. at 137, for a slightly different
formulation. See also Rawls, supra note 2, at 148.
60. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Rawls on Constitutionalism and
Constitutional Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS, supra note 27, at
394 passim.
61. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 6–7.
62. RAWLS, supra note 53, at 488; Rawls, supra note 2, at 148.
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bounds of the publicly reasonable), they are legitimate even
if they are considered by some to be unjust.63
Third, legitimacy “is a weaker idea than justice and
imposes weaker constraints on [authority and on] what can
be done. It is also institutional, though there is of course an
essential connection with justice.”64 Yet, even if the
constitution is legitimate, there might be situations in which
the injustice of the outcomes is so grave that the constitution
ceases to be legitimate. In these cases, the society is no longer
a “well-ordered society” (a fair system of cooperation between
free and equal citizens):
But before this point is reached, the outcomes of a legitimate
[democratic] procedure are legitimate whatever they are. This gives
us purely procedural democratic legitimacy and distinguishes it
from justice, even granting that justice is not specified procedurally.
Legitimacy allows for an indeterminate range of injustice that
justice does not.65

Fourth, it follows that there is a gap between legitimacy
and justice. Reasonable people recognize they can achieve
neither a perfectly just political ordering nor unanimity.
These are two different reasons. In A Theory of Justice,
Rawls invokes mainly the first and in Political Liberalism,
he emphasizes the second. As for the question of
disagreement: when citizens devise the general structure of
political authority, they will not insist on including all the
principles of justice but will agree, each one from her own
reasonable comprehensive doctrine (thus forming an
“overlapping consensus”), on a list of “constitutional
essentials,” that is, a bill of political rights with a social

63. For a similar focus on the regime-level rather than the statute, see Frank
I. Michelman, Ida’s Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental System,
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (2003). However, Michelman’s view is more expansive
than Rawls’ since it takes into account not merely the constitution but the totality
of the regime (which means that it includes, inter alia, prevalent constitutional
interpretations practiced in the state).
64. Rawls, supra note 2, at 175.
65. Id. at 176.
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minimum. Hence, so long as the constitution is “sufficiently
just” or “reasonably just” or “just enough” in “view of the
circumstances and social conditions,” then the general
structure of the political regime is legitimate.66 And so long
as laws are enacted and decisions are decided in accordance
with this reasonably just constitution—the procedures and
conditions it sets forth—they are legitimate laws and
decisions.
Concretely, the second principle of justice (which
includes both the fair equality of opportunity and the
difference principle) will not make it to this list of
“constitutional essentials.” The importance of the effect of
this exclusion on Rawlsian theory cannot be overestimated.
After all, the second principle of justice “marks the difference
between laissez-faire capitalism and welfare state
liberalism” as it “expresses the recognition that class
stratification and the resulting inequality of chances in life
are social evils bearing on the justice of a society.”67 Rawls
says the egalitarianism of his theory rests on three pillars:
the difference principle (social and economic inequality is
justified if it works to the greatest benefit of the worst off
amongst members of society; this can be institutionally
expressed through income and property taxation as well as
economic and fiscal policies), the fair equality of opportunity
principle (which would ensure equal access to all offices and
positions), and the fair value of political liberties within the
first principle of justice (which would ensure that disparities
in wealth do not distort the political process and the equal
enjoyment and exercise of political liberties whether in terms
of holding public offices or influencing political decisions).
The last two ensure that rights are not “purely formal.”68
Thus, the fair equality of opportunity
requires (in addition to formal equality of opportunity or non-

66. Id. at 175.
67. Nagel, supra note 27, at 68.
68. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 6–7.
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discrimination on grounds of race, gender, religion, etc.) equal
educational opportunities, a right to basic health care for all
citizens, and governments’ limitations of concentrations of wealth
when they tend to undermine fair equal opportunities. 69

Only the fair value of political liberties is part of the
“constitutional essentials.”70 Thus, the principles that seek
to prevent morally-arbitrary and undeserved social
inequalities are sacrificed.
Consequently, Rawls’ assertion that his theoretical move
does not undermine his egalitarianism is not compelling. The
reasons he invokes to justify this sacrifice are essentially
appeals to the virtues of moderation and pragmatism.
Reasonable people, he maintains, will give up the second
principle given their “political wisdom”;71 the suspension of
their passions, sentiments, and intensity of desires;72 their
recognition of the “wide differences of reasonable opinion” in
such questions (especially given the difficulty to monitor
their realization);73 their ultimate recognition of the lesser
urgency and significance of socio-economic rights;74 and that
expanding the list of basic liberties to more than the “truly
essential” will “risk weakening the protection of the most
essential ones” and thus would undermine the “priority of
liberty” (which refuses to sacrifice basic liberties for the
purpose of economic improvement).75
Given the failure to include all the principles of justice in
the basic structure, for Rawls there is a considerable gap
between justice and legitimacy. The gap is not merely a
natural outcome of the fact of imperfection in human life, but
also necessary given the fact of reasonable pluralism. That
69. FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 469–70.
70. See Michelman, supra note 60, at 406.
71. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 156.
72. Id. at 190.
73. Id. at 229–30.
74. Id. at 230, 367.
75. Id. at 296.
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is, Political Liberalism increases the gap between the
demands of liberal justice for the well-ordered society, as
advocated in A Theory of Justice, and the exercise of coercive
power in the well-ordered society.76 The exercise of political
power need not await the complete adoption of liberal justice.
A welfare capitalist state is for Rawls an unjust state, yet it
is a legitimate deployment of political power.77 Concretely,
consider the example of basic health care for all citizens. For
Rawls, this a requirement of justice.78 But its absence does
not impact the legitimacy of the regime. The existence of
millions of United States citizens without health care is
unjust, but a political regime that enables these conditions is
legitimate.79
Fifth, the stability of political liberalism will be
guaranteed by the “overlapping consensus” of reasonable
comprehensive doctrines. Each reasonable and rational
citizen from her own conception of the good and for her own
reasons will come to accept and endorse the principles of
justice. It is the fact that comprehensive doctrines and their
adherents are reasonable that makes them converge over the
principles of justice. They internalize the political conception
of justice as part of their conception of the good.80 If a
majority of the citizens comprise this consensus, then the
political conception of justice will be stable, otherwise it will
not. Those who do not endorse it are simply unreasonable

76. WILLIAMS, supra note 33, at 1.
77. FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 395.
78. RAWLS, supra note 17, at lvi–lvii.
79. See, e.g., Lisa Girion, Ranks of Uninsured in U.S. Shrank in ‘07, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2007), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-aug-27-ficensus27-story.html; Jessica Glenza, Number of Uninsured Americans Increases
by
7m
in
Four
Years,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
23,
2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/23/healthcare-usamericans-uninsured-2014-gallup.
80. Samuel Freeman, Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just
Democratic Constitution, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 627 (1994).
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that should be coerced by the law.81
2. Dworkin
Dworkin’s Law’s Empire, which is concerned with
justifying the coercive power of legal ordering, makes a
similar move.82 There he acknowledges a gap between the
“true community” (that treats its members with equal
concern and respect) and the just community. Although the
moral community or the “community of principle” (a
community constituted by integrity since its members
recognize that they are governed by common principles) is a
true community, it is not necessarily just. Indeed, “[a]n
association of principle is not automatically a just
community; its conception of equal concern may be defective
or it may violate the rights of its citizens or citizens of other
nations . . . .”83
This gap is a result of the fact that there are different
desirable ideals and virtues (justice, fairness, due process,
integrity) that are at play and might be the subject of
disagreement in law and politics. Fairness and justice do not
collapse into each other: “fair institutions sometimes produce
unjust decisions and unfair institutions just ones.”84
Integrity is needed to express a single, coherent scheme of
principle in which these ideals are ranked properly when
disagreement occurs.85 The need for integrity arises precisely
because a perfectly-just society is beyond reach. Indeed, in
such a society, integrity would be redundant.86 Under
conditions of pluralism—in which citizens disagree over

81. RAWLS, supra note 53, at 489; Dreben, supra note 57, at 329.
82. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 190.
83. Id. at 213.
84. Id. at 177.
85. Id. at 178, 219, 404.
86. Id. at 176. See also id. at 165, 216; RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY
POSSIBLE HERE?: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE 95 (2006) (arguing that
legitimacy does not need to be perfectly just).
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justice, fairness and political morality—a “community of
principle” is as a “true community” as any community can
get.87 Different people may have different theories of justice.
Indeed, Dworkin himself has his own theory. But the
question of law’s legitimacy is concerned with the
deployment of coercive power and cannot rely on a subjective
and non-consensual theory of justice.88 In a utopian world,
citizens might agree on the same principles of justice like
Dworkin’s or Rawls’. Rawlsian principles of justice, however,
do not regulate the ordinary world of politics (not everyone
agrees to these principles) and have no bearing on the
question of legitimacy.89 In addition, obligations of justice are
“conceptually universalistic” and do not explain obligations
to specific communities under historical conditions. Thus
legitimacy cannot be grounded in justice. Integrity, rather
than justice, is the “parent” of legitimacy.90 A state is morally
justified, and hence legitimate, if it endorses integrity and
then it gives rise to a general obligation to obey the law.91
Legitimacy requires integrity in legislation, adjudication,
and in the moral community at large.92
Like Rawls, legitimacy for Dworkin is a normative rather
than a sociological notion. And it is concerned with the
general structure of political ordering: “Political obligation
is . . . not just a matter of obeying the discrete political
decisions of the community one by one;” rather it is “a more
protestant idea: fidelity to a scheme of principle[s].”93
Like Rawls, Dworkin thinks that the legitimate political
regime is the reasonably just one.94 In Taking Rights
87. DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 214; see also id. at 411.
88. Id. at 97.
89. Id. at 192.
90. Id. at 193.
91. Id. at 191, 214–15.
92. Id. at 166.
93. Id. at 190.
94. This view is by no means limited to Rawls and Dworkin. Other liberal
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Seriously he writes:
The constitution sets out a general political scheme that is
sufficiently just to be taken as settled for reasons of fairness.
Citizens take the benefit of living in a society whose institutions are
arranged and governed in accordance with that scheme, and they
must take the burdens as well, at least until a new scheme is put
into force either by discrete amendment or general revolution. 95

Thus, there is a range of permissible injustice. But, like
Rawls, it should not be too unjust. While Dworkin thinks
unjust decisions can be interpreted as mistakes from the
standpoint of integrity, they should not be too unjust. If the
unjust practice or institution is gravely and pervasively
unjust then it cannot be redeemed, as it were, interpretively
through a constructive method and it “should . . . be
abandoned.”96
C. Restricting Politics by Legitimacy
The picture is complicated by the fact that the move from
the good to the just involves a restriction of the good by the
just, and the move from justice to legitimacy involves a
restriction of demands made on behalf of justice by
legitimacy conditions. These conditions impose structural,
moral constraints on politics.97 These restrictions apply not
only to politics that violates the principles of justice, but also
politics that seeks to advance justice. They might not be
restricted in similar ways, but the restriction goes both ways.
The legitimacy conditions are justified in imposing such
constraints given their non-controversial, public character.

authors have invoked the idea of a reasonably just regime in different ways. See,
e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1792 (2005).
95. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 106 (4th prtg. 1978).
96. DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 203–04.
97. WILLIAMS, supra note 33, at 2 (discussing models of political theory, of
which Rawls and Dworkin are primary examples, that prioritize the moral over
the political and thus political theory becomes “applied morality”).
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1. Rawls
The Rawlsian “priority of liberty,” which prioritizes basic
liberties over social justice, is “the true core of liberalism.”98
According to this priority: “justice draws the limit,” while
“the good shows the point.”99 That is, “admissible ideas of the
good” can be sustained in an established framework of the
political conception of justice as fairness. Consequently, one
does not only ascend from the particular, subjective, and
controversial to the general, universal, and impartial, but
also one is confined by this move. One moves from the good
to the just but then the just comes back to supervise the good.
Individuals in society have rights that would protect them
not only from unreasonable conceptions of the good that
others may pursue, but also from mobilizing the coercive
power of the state to advance reasonable conceptions of the
good that they do not adhere to. Specifically, justice
constrains majoritarian considerations of welfare and
utilitarian calculus.100 However, justice does not always
constrain the good. The principles of justice that Rawls calls
“matters of basic justice” (these include the difference
principle and fair equality of opportunity) do not constrain
the good in the same way the equal basic liberties do because
they are not considered part of the “constitutional
essentials.”101
This distinction between “constitutional essentials” and
“matters of basic justice” requires a consideration of the
constraints imposed on justice by legitimacy. There are two
interrelated ways in which the constraints are manifested:
the first is synchronic and the second is diachronic. The
synchronic is concerned with what cannot be done in the here
and the now. Here, the move from justice to legitimacy

98. Nagel, supra note 27, at 66–67.
99. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 174; John Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas
of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251, 252 (1988).
100. RAWLS, supra note 11, at 3. See also DWORKIN, supra note 95, at xi.
101. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 228–29.
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means that legitimacy does not include all the principles of
justice and thus justice constrains the good only insofar it is
part and parcel of the conditions of legitimacy. That does not
mean that one cannot criticize existing arrangements and
policies from the perspective of justice. Yet all demands in
the name of the just or the good should be raised within the
legitimate structure and such demands do not necessarily
have the coercive power of the law on their side. They might
even be barred from mobilizing state law under conditions of
reasonable disagreement by deploying rights to constrain
democratic will. If there is no consensus in society over
measures to advance the difference principle or the fair
equality of opportunity, these measures can be hindered by
the deployment of individual rights. What underlies the
acceptance of such conditions as legitimate seems to be the
following logic: Once the political community secures the
first Rawlsian principle of justice (which includes the
negative liberties, the social minimum, and the fair value of
political liberties), it will not risk anarchy and insecurity for
the sake of the difference principle and fair equality of
opportunity. In other words, legitimacy confines justice.
It is misleading for Rawls to stipulate that “justice draws
the limit” in the priority of liberty. It is more accurate to say,
within the Rawlsian framework, “legitimacy draws the
limit.” In effect, legitimacy constrains both justice and the
good. The importance of this qualification is to make clear
that fewer constraints than initially proclaimed by theory
are imposed on the good, given the gap between justice and
legitimacy, and thus more injustice passes muster. Justice
limits the good only partially (to the extent that some of its
principles became part and parcel of the conditions of
legitimacy).
One way to understand this limitation is to see how the
advancement of substantive demands that are required by
justice is restricted by procedural requirements of
legitimacy. It is insufficient for legislative or judicial
pronouncements to be substantively just, they need also to
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respect accepted democratic procedures and practices.
Officials and judges cannot impose the difference principle or
health care, for example, on an unwilling populace or
legislature.102 Thus, contra Tushnet, a Rawlsian judge
cannot use the difference principle in order to advance the
cause of socialism.103 Moreover, Rawls makes clear that the
difference principle is not a proper justification for civil
disobedience because regime compliance with it is “more
difficult to ascertain”, and citizens disagree about “economic
and social institutions and policies.”104
The second sense of constraint by legitimacy on justice is
historical or diachronic. Rawls adopts a four-stage sequence
that is neither actual nor purely theoretical. The first stage
is the original position in which the principles of justice are
chosen. The second stage is a convention in which the
constitution is established. The third stage is the legislative
assembly in which the legislators enact laws. The fourth
stage is the judicial stage in which judges interpret the
laws.105 Here, Rawls says that once we discover that we have
established an imperfect constitution, we embark upon a
project of political reform to correct the imperfections in
order to achieve a more just society. The continuous project
of reform is limited, however, in two ways. First, it is limited
in terms of the subject because it is confined to the reflective
judgments of the reasonable and not the rational, and the
reasonable will be confined by the idea of “public reason” and
its companion idea of “civility” and the requirement to appeal
only “to presently accepted general beliefs and forms of
reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and
conclusions of science when these are not controversial.”
Secondly, it is limited in terms of the object of reformist

102. FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 206, 235, 378, 394; RAWLS, supra note 11, at
174.
103. Mark V. Tushnet, Diatribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694 (1980).
104. RAWLS, supra note 11, at 327.
105. Id. at 195–201.
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reflection because the principles of justice are “fixed.” Rawls
writes: “we cannot change them to suit our rational interests
and knowledge of circumstances as we please.”106
Rawls argues the political autonomy of citizens is
preserved both because they live under a sufficiently just
constitution and because they have the ability to reform it.
Rawls offers here a distinction between founders, who create
the political structure, and revisers, who are born into these
structures. Founders establish a constitution and the
revisers materialize their political autonomy through a
continuous process of correcting the imperfections. The fact
that revisers are born into a constitutional structure, with
“wisdom” and institutions inherited from the founders, does
not undermine—Rawls asserts—their full political
autonomy. Rawls uses an analogy to Kant’s writings in order
to support his claim that the revisers’ political autonomy is
not encroached upon. Reading Kant’s writings, Rawls
argues, does not deprive us from reaching moral insights:
“Why is understanding the justice of the constitution any
different?”107 Surely this is a weak analogy. Revisers are
born into the constitutional structure but the reader is not
born into Kant’s writings. One can read Kant or not, can
understand him or not, be influenced by him or not, but one
cannot avoid encountering social and political structures.
Additionally, citizens are not implicated in constructing and
reproducing Kant’s ideas in the same way they are in sociopolitical structures. The question becomes not merely one of
possessing the intellectual ability to envisage necessary
revisions, but also the potential for the development of
political forces that would make these revisions a reality.
This potential is shaped by the extant structures, because
the “sufficiently just” constitution sanctions social injustice
and thus unevenly empowers different groups in society.

106. Rawls, supra note 2, at 153.
107. Id. at 156.
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2. Dworkin
Dworkinian integrity (being the basis of legitimacy that
it is) constrains justice. Although integrity is not necessarily
the last word in terms of action,108 and it is not always the
case that justice is defeated when confronted by integrity,109
the latter does impose meaningful constraints. Accordingly,
under the community of principle, citizens have a
responsibility to respect the “principles of fairness and
justice instinct in the standing political arrangement” even
if these are not the best principles when compared to other
communities or judged from a utopian vantage point.110 This
community “commands that no one be left out, that we are
all in politics together for better or for worse, that no one may
be sacrificed, like wounded left on the battlefield, to the
crusade for justice overall.”111 This statement implies that
one might need to accommodate injustice and those who
represent it and defend it in the name of integrity.112
In addition, the judge—including Hercules, the judge
with infinite resources and time—is constrained by integrity
and history. Although a proponent of Dworkinian equality of
resources as he might be, he has to settle for less and cannot
impose
economic and redistributive programs that equality of resources
demands. Nor, given the various constraints he accepts about how
far he is free to read statutes to promote his view of justice, can he
read into welfare and taxation schemes provisions equality of
resources would approve.113

Indeed, Dworkin insists that he himself does not
read the Constitution to contain all the important principles of

108. DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 217–19.
109. Id. at 214.
110. Id. at 213.
111. Id.
112. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 206 (1999).
113. DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 404.

2019]

WHAT GOOD IS ABSTRACTION?

851

political liberalism. In other writings, for example, I defend a theory
of economic justice that would require a substantial redistribution
of wealth in rich political societies. . . . I have insisted that integrity
would bar any attempt to argue from the abstract moral clauses of
the Bill of Rights, or from any other part of the Constitution, to any
such result.114

One may contest the idea that integrity or the legal materials
(such as precedent) or history can considerably constrain the
judge in interpreting and applying the constitution. But the
main point here is that within Dworkin’s theoretical
framework, he understands himself and his judges to be
constrained in the domain of legitimacy in ways that the
discussion within the domain of justice is not similarly
constrained.
D. Conclusion: The Career of Thinning Out
Doubtless, given the complexity and wealth of the ideas
of the scholars discussed here, a comprehensive reading of
their entire corpus cannot be offered here. Nevertheless, this
theoretical engagement with some core concepts captures the
broad lines of the general moves performed by leading
progressive liberal scholars and its effect on the overall
movement of liberal egalitarianism. Here is a summary of
some of the highlights of this story of the movement of liberal
thought:
First, the good life is too thick and particular and hence
too controversial and unsuitable to serve as a solid
foundation upon which the political-legal order can be
erected. Therefore, there is a need for a thinner basis. But it
cannot be too thin since it should be recognizably liberal.
Justice is such a basis. (This is the move from the good to
justice).
Second, the defense of justice as the foundation for the
liberal order cannot be too liberal (comprehensive), rather it

114. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 36 (Replica Books 1997) (1996); see also id. at 10.
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should be defended on the thinnest basis possible (political
liberalism). Otherwise, it will not be acceptable to a widerange of views and ways of life. It should address individuals
in their role as citizens only. (This is the move from
comprehensive to political liberalism within the move from
the good to justice).
Third, justice is controversial. Even progressive liberal
scholars cannot agree on what liberal justice requires. It
cannot be assumed even under favorable conditions that
justice will have one and only one universally accepted
interpretation. Therefore, there is a need for a thinner
ground for the political order to secure agreement and hence
a solid foundation. But it cannot be too thin because it will
be no more than sociological acceptance. For it to be liberal,
it needs to contain the minimal conditions of liberal justice
that seem to be less controversial. (This is the move from
justice to legitimacy).
Fourth, egalitarian distributive justice is not necessarily
influenced by the second move (from the comprehensive to
the political) but is influenced by the third move (from justice
to legitimacy) since it creates a gap between justice and
legitimacy and this gap justifies restrictions on the ways in
which liberal justice can be advanced and demanded.
It is not suggested here that this process of thinning out
is an inherent characteristic of liberal theory, or that this is
the only defensible way of reading liberal theory. The main
contention here is that the moves described above have been
characteristic of contemporary liberal egalitarian theory as
its leading scholars have developed it. This interpretation of
these moves shows a liberal process of thinning out. The
warrant for this thinning out is to narrow down
disagreement. But do these moves achieve this goal? The
following maintains that they do not.
II. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF LIBERAL LEGITIMACY
In a double-move, liberal scholars travel from the good to
justice and then from justice to legitimacy, that is, from thick

2019]

WHAT GOOD IS ABSTRACTION?

853

conceptions for regulating social and political life to thinner
conceptions, from the particular to the universal.
Supposedly, this move allows these scholars to avoid
disagreement that is evident in the pursuit of the good life
but also recognized with respect to the principles of justice.115
Liberal scholars do not argue that their theories will
eradicate disagreement but that they will considerably
reduce disagreement and therefore allow a convergence over
an idea of legitimacy of the general structure of legal-political
ordering.116 In turn, this arrival at solid foundations for
regulating the political life of the community justifies
restrictions on this political life. However, each step in this
theoretical framework is controversial. It either presupposes
a controversial substance when it claims to be proceduralist
and universalist, or rests on indeterminate abstract
concepts. The critique of this proceduralization is not merely
that it contains substantive ideas but also that this
substance (legitimacy standards) is controversial.117 In other
words, the institutional framework for governance and
conflict-resolution is no less contentious than the
substantive-moral issues it seeks to circumvent. Moreover,
the abstract concepts and principles this abstraction leads to
do not exclusively dictate a particular form of social life. This
is because they are compatible with competing institutional
arrangements.118
The purpose of what follows is to offer a brief account, by
no means exhaustive, of some of the typical kinds of
115. Rawls calls his conception of political liberalism a “method of avoidance”
because it avoids relying on controversial comprehensive doctrines. John Rawls,
Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 231
(1985).
116. See RAWLS, supra note 17, at 28; RAWLS, supra note 8, at 151.
117. Proceduralism does not imply necessarily a lack of substance. RAWLS,
supra note 17, at 192 (denying that his theory is procedurally neutral and
acknowledging that his principles of justice are substantive). See also Joshua
Cohen, Pluralism and Proceduralism, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 589 passim (1994).
118. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97(6)
HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1293 (1984).
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disagreement
that
progressive
liberal
theoretical
frameworks give rise to, even amongst the progressive
liberals themselves. It is an account of the ways in which the
declared purpose of deflecting disagreement is unceasingly
undermined. Consequently, rather than containing
disagreement, the method of abstraction generates more
disagreement. The process of thinning out, therefore, is futile
as it does not secure a universally acceptable standard for
legitimacy.
A. Disagreement All the Way Down
While the focus here will be on the move from justice to
legitimacy, the reasons for objecting for each kind of
proceduralization (proceduralization of the question of the
good by deflecting to justice and proceduralization of the
question of justice by deflecting to legitimacy) are quite
analogous.119
Michelman’s critique of the proceduralist turn to
legitimacy as an authoritative answer to disagreements
establishes that disagreement cannot be papered over by any
account of proceduralism and thus substantive judgments
that lead to disagreement are inevitable.120 It is doubtful
whether there can be a non-controversial public answer to
the question of political authority and legal ordering to which
either “everyone” or the “rational and the reasonable” would
assent. A major reason for that is the abstraction of rules and
principles. MacIntyre observes that these principles are
abstract and empty since they do not “guide action” or, if they

119. For a critique of the detachment of justice from the good and for an
argument that this very detachment breeds disagreement rather than narrows it
down, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 39 (3d ed. 2007); Alasdair
MacIntyre, The Privatization of Good: An Inaugural Lecture, 52 REV. POL. 344
passim (1990).
120. Frank I. Michelman, The Not So Puzzling Persistence of the Futile Search:
Tribe on Proceduralism in Constitutional Theory, 42 TULSA L. REV. 891 passim
(2007).
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are specific enough to guide action, controversial.121
Similarly, Michelman points out that it is precisely the
alleged proceduralist evasion of controversial substance by
fleeing to abstraction (in order to provide grounds for
legitimacy) that prevents constitutional legitimation of
political acts (given its emptiness and indeterminate
nature).122 Michelman concludes that legitimacy cannot be
obtained once and for all but can only be approximated, and
it is eventually subject to individual judgment in which all
things are considered.123
1. Legitimacy’s
Essentials

Contract:

Rawlsian

Constitutional

Michelman’s critique of the centrality of the idea of the
constitution to Rawlsian and Habermasian conceptions of
legitimacy illustrates their weaknesses. This is because they
seek to deflect judgments on the rightness of concrete
political acts and legislative enactments to judgment on the
regime’s overall legitimacy by virtue of its constitution’s
conformity with acceptable constitutional rules (which
express the fundamental terms of the political
community).124
The problem, however, with such constitution-based
notions of legitimacy is that the normative constitution tells
us very little about the reality of political authority. The hope
that such a constitution will provide a “public” convergence
or wide acceptance, notwithstanding intractable and deep
disagreements, founders. The retreat to core and abstract
universal notions that everyone could agree to will not

121. MacIntyre, supra note 119, at 349.
122. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Legitimation for Political
Acts, 66 MOD. L. REV. 1, 13 (2003).
123. See Frank I. Michelman, A Reply to Baker and Balkin, 39 TULSA L. REV.
649 passim (2004); Frank I. Michelman, Reply to Ming-Sung Kuo, 7 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 715 passim (2009).
124. Frank I. Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?, 8 REV.
CONST. STUD. 101, 121 (2003).
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guarantee such an acceptance. Rights guaranteed by
constitutions are too abstract to inform citizens’ judgments
regarding the regime’s overall legitimacy. In order to make
such a judgment, one will have to include other
considerations like the interpretations and applications of
these rights and the institutions and practices put in place
to interpret and apply them. To use Michelman’s phrase, one
will have to consider the “governmental totality.” But to
include such considerations would defeat the purpose of the
constitutional contractual idea that requires abstracting
from these controversial concrete practices. Furthermore,
the fact that the constitution could have been interpreted and
applied in other ways that would have been more congenial
to one’s orientations is likely to be less material to one’s
judgment of the political regime as it is practiced here and
now under the constitution’s name.125
The difficulties that Rawls faces are representative of
the shortcomings of the contractual idea of legitimacy.
Central to the Rawlsian liberal principle of legitimacy is the
notion of “constitutional essentials” (which include the basic
civil and political liberties and a social minimum). It is the
conformity to these essentials that renders the regime
legitimate. They serve as the yardstick for legitimacy. Yet
this yardstick is vulnerable to four challenges: overinclusion, under-inclusion, inadequacy, and incoherence.
First, over-inclusion
Rights enumerated in the bill of rights are abstract and
mean different things to different people at different times.
It is precisely the detachment of these rights from their
practical, concrete manifestations that makes them abstract
background conditions to the legal-political order.126 Yet a
125. Id. at 122–24.
126. Interestingly, some liberal scholars’ answer for this worry is to call for
more rather than fewer abstractions. For instance, Ackerman criticizes judicial
rulings he disagrees with on account of their deployment of “selective
abstractions.” Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 317,
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carte blanche cannot serve as a publicly recognized test for
legitimacy.127 The Rawlsian conception of legitimacy that
focuses on an abstract bill of rights is unsuccessful because
it is over-inclusive. Citizens cannot be expected to consent to
a carte blanche in their judgment to grant legitimacy to the
regime under which they live. Such a conception is
particularly over-inclusive from the Right side. This is
because it lacks much of the theory’s egalitarianism given
the exclusion of some principles of justice (namely, fair
equality of opportunity and the difference principle) from the
“constitutional essentials.” Consequently, the Rawlsian
attempt to rectify the deficiency of the formality of rights
fails. Therefore, this standard of legitimacy is potentially
compatible with conservative and Right-wing institutional
arrangements that exacerbate inequality and poverty in
society.128
Second, under-inclusion
The “constitutional essentials” are under-inclusive from
the Left side because progressives would demand the
introduction of other essential items to the Rawlsian list.
318, 321 (1992). Ackerman, thus, calls for a systematic approach to the Bill of
Rights that deploys a “robust abstractionism.” Id. at 339. He asks judges to apply
the “same level of abstraction” to rights and powers. Id. at 346.
127. Frank I. Michelman, Human Rights and the Limits of Constitutional
Theory, 13 RATIO JURIS 63 (2000).
128. Famously, the leading neo-liberal theorist Friedrich Hayek declared, “the
differences between us [i.e. Hayek and Rawls] seemed more verbal than
substantial . . . we agree on what is to me the essential point.” FRIEDRICH A.
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, VOLUME 2: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE xiii (1976). Hayek here is referring to Rawls’ approach of pure procedural
justice. He explains that he has “no basic quarrel” with Rawls because they agree
that background principles of justice apply to institutions and do not dictate
distributive patterns. Thus, once the just institutions are in place the distributive
outcomes are just. Id. at 100. See Andrew Lister, The “Mirage” of Social Justice:
Hayek Against (and For) Rawls, 25 CRITICAL REV. 409 (2013) (arguing that there
are “four main areas of Rawls-Hayek convergence: the importance of ‘pure
procedural justice,’ the irrelevance of merit, the use of a veil of ignorance, and the
principle that inequalities should benefit everyone,” and that their
disagreements are primarily empirical/political rather than philosophical. Id. at
411–12.)
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Such additional items might include those principles and
requirements of justice that Rawls himself proposes but
declines to include in the essentials (given his judgment that
they are less urgent and their violations are less
transparent).129 Scholars have suggested different ways in
which Rawls’ concerns can be alleviated. Understanding
social and economic rights as “directive principles,” to which
129. For such an argument, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Race, Labor, and the
Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643 (2004). Shiffrin
argues that Rawls does not pay enough attention to questions of race and labor.
For racial discrimination to be adequately addressed there is a need for an
explicit, formal, anti-discrimination principle in the constitutional essentials.
The benefit from such a principle cannot be convincingly addressed by the
structures put in place by virtue of the two principles of justice, given the
predominantly negative character of rights guaranteed by the constitutional
essentials and because racism is not necessarily rooted in material sources. Nor
can it be included in the first principle or the difference principle by sheer
interpretive strategies. “Not all forms of discrimination have an impact upon the
equal enjoyment of the formal basic liberties . . . . For example, racially-based
employment discrimination [and] housing discrimination . . . . To put it
concretely, it is unclear what specific provision of the two principles would
directly condemn as unjust the treatment of Rosa Parks . . . .” Id. at 1647. In
addition, such a principle would meet the Rawlsian criteria for constitutional
essentials: its violation would be transparent—it would not require complex
information—and it is urgent. Id. at 1660. As for labor, Shiffrin argues that fair
equality of opportunity cannot be satisfied by the difference principle given the
centrality of work to ways of life in ways that are not reducible to income and
wealth. Id. at 1666–70. While such a principle might raise questions of complex
nature, these would not be very different from challenges facing abstract and
vague basic liberties. Id. at 1675. For a different view, see Tommie Shelby, Race
and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1697, 1708–09
(2004). Shelby claims that racial discrimination can be adequately addressed by
Rawlsian theory as it stands without serious changes in the principles and their
priority. It seems to me, however, that Shelby misses an important aspect of
Shiffrin’s argument which is the focus on constitutional essentials that are part
of the theory of legitimacy. This means that Shelby’s reply is inadequate because
Shiffrin’s argument attempts to bring the fair equality of opportunity to the
status of a constitutional essential against the backdrop of the absence of this
principle from Rawlsian legitimacy. Thus, one can accept Shelby’s argument that
the principle of fair equality of opportunity can address the effects of historical
injustice on disadvantaged groups, id. at 1710–12, and yet accept Shiffrin’s
position. If the principle indeed plays that role in the theory of justice then its
exclusion from the constitutional essentials means that the political and legal
system may not be able to address these issues of injustice (specifically given the
fact of reasonable disagreement). In fact, it is for the purpose of playing such a
role one would argue that it should be explicitly included in the essentials.
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participants of Rawlsian public reason aspire to, rather than
enforceable rights, might address the “transparency”
objection.130 Furthermore, the “lesser urgency” objection is
not necessarily an argument against inclusion in the
essentials. Indeed, an explicit constitutional clause that
prioritizes basic political and civil rights can meet this
objection.131 According to these arguments, Rawls’
justifications for declining to include the rights entailed by
the second principle of justice fail.
Third, inadequacy
It is unclear what kinds of deviations from the
“constitutional essentials” should to be tolerated. Rawls
never really specifies when the system would be “too unjust”
or when the injustice of the outcomes would be so grave to
render the universal reasonable and rational acceptability of
the “constitutional essentials” immaterial and thus the
regime will forfeit its legitimacy.132 This ambiguity is
significant since it is relevant to the question of line-drawing
between justice and legitimacy and the disagreement that
reasonable people will have on this question. More
importantly, when this ambiguity is coupled with the charge
of under-inclusion from the Left and over-inclusion from the
Right, it leads to an inadequate yardstick for legitimacy.
Michelman argues that without the inclusion of socioeconomic guarantees in the form of directive principles, the
constitution would be morally defective and cannot
legitimate the exercise of political power.133 Likewise,
130. Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal
Political Justification, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 13 passim (2003).
131. CÉCILE FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER
LIFE 85 (2000).

THE

CONSTITUTION: GOVERNMENT

AND THE DECENT

132. For a similar point see Tommie Shelby, Justice, Deviance, and the Dark
Ghetto, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 126, 145 (2007).
133. Michelman, supra note 127 passim; see also Frank I. Michelman,
Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining America Away, 6 INT’L
J. CONST. L. 663 (2008). In his later writings Rawls suggests that the difference
principle be included in the constitution’s preamble as a non-judicially
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Tommie Shelby suggests that the Rawlsian “constitutional
essentials” are an inadequate measure for whether the
political regime has exceeded the limits of “tolerable
injustice” because “it does not ensure genuine conditions of
reciprocity for the most disadvantaged in the scheme.”134
Fourth, incoherence
Constitutional rules that regulate politics are not only
contentious but also contradictory. Rawls seeks to reconcile
liberty and equality,135 and thus considers the fair value of
political liberties a requirement for both justice and
legitimacy. Accordingly, restrictions on campaign finance are
necessary to prevent the translation of disparities in wealth
into electoral influence that corrupts the political system.
Rawls considers Supreme Court rulings that struck down
attempts to restrict the influence of money on politics as a
rejection of the fair value of political liberties.136 Another
reading emerges, however, if one recognizes the possibility of
conflict between values. The reasoning invoked by
conservative judges to support corporate power would not
violate the Rawlsian constraint of “public reason” so long as
they primarily invoke “political” reasons rather than
conceptions of the good in defense of their position. Indeed,
these rulings may be seen alternatively as part of a struggle
between two incompatible conceptions of freedom of speech:
a libertarian that privileges liberty over equality, an

enforceable principle. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 162.
134. Shelby, supra note 132, at 148–49. Rawls suggests that these are
questions of individual reflection and decision. See RAWLS, supra note 11, at 371–
82.
135. FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 308; RAWLS, supra note 11, at 211; RAWLS,
supra note 8, at 2; JOHN RAWLS, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, in
COLLECTED PAPERS 303, 305 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999); RAWLS, supra note 17,
at 326–27, 339, 369.
136. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 17, at 356–62 (criticizing Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976)). See also Ronald Dworkin, ‘The “Devastating” Decision’: An
Exchange, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2010, passim (criticizing Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
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egalitarian that privileges equality over liberty.137
This incoherence in the system of rights is a result of
indeterminacy. The abstract notion of rights does not
necessarily lead to a determinate result, nor does it
necessarily preclude the arrival at any of these contradictory
results. Rawlsian theory cannot immunize the scheme of
liberties from this indeterminacy. It can be said that Rawls
does not allow that one position is as good as another and
provides a criterion for judgment in the face of conflicting
positions with respect to the interpretations of the abstract
principles of justice. This criterion requires the adjustment
of basic liberties within a “fully adequate scheme of liberties”
and orientates the liberties’ specification toward the theory’s
egalitarian objectives.138
However, abstraction is Janus-faced: the abstract nature
of rights may be congenial to a thin conception of legitimacy
but this very abstractness undermines the attempt to ascribe
a determinate content to the interpretation and application
of rights in concrete situations. Had this concrete content
been inscribed in the “constitutional essentials” ab initio,
then the theory would have lost its claim to proceduralism
that allows the alleged convergence over legitimacy. The
Rawlsian legitimate structure cannot dictate the Rawlsian
interpretation of the legitimacy standards. If this were the
case then his justice standards would be indistinguishable
from his legitimacy standards.
Thus, the inclusion of the fair value of political liberties
in the “constitutional essentials” is not likely to secure an
egalitarian political system because it does not rest on a
coherent basis.139 This is especially the case when the
137. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 143, 144–45 (2010).
138. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 331–34. Elsewhere, Rawls writes: “No basic
liberty is absolute, since they may conflict in particular cases, and their claims
must be adjusted to fit into one coherent scheme of liberties.” RAWLS, supra note
8, at 104.
139. But see Amy Gutman, Rawls on the Relationship Between Liberalism and
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“difference principle”—whose role through progressive
taxation is “to prevent accumulations of wealth that are . . .
inimical to background justice, for example, the fair value of
the political liberties and to fair equality of opportunity”—is
lacking.140
These kinds of controversies, that Rawls’ conception of
legitimacy gives rise to, show that his conception fails to
achieve what it was set to achieve: reducing disagreement
about justice amongst the reasonable and narrowing the field
of contestation by “fixing” some of the demands of justice as
acceptable “essentials” that are allegedly less controversial
than the other demands of justice.
2. Is Dworkin’s Integrity Possible?
Dworkin’s integrity faces similar difficulties. The
reasonably just regime for Dworkin is that which endorses
the ideal of integrity. Yet, Dworkin’s invocation of integrity
is no less controversial than the disagreements over justice
it tries to circumvent.
To begin with, the background conditions that integrity
presupposes are questionable and the results it seeks to
derive from them are controversial. Dworkin’s integrity, and
hence his notion of legitimacy, is possible if one accepts that
there is an identifiable and shared coherent scheme of
principles and that judges are able to work out law’s integrity
by teasing out the fundamental commitments of the
community and enacting its political morality. Dworkin
introduces the notion of principles in reaction to the view of
the law as a collection of rules, a view associated with
positivist scholars. The law, according to Dworkin, is
Democracy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS, supra note 27, at 168
passim. Gutman argues the criterion Rawlsian theory provides can help avoid
indeterminacy. Id. at 183–84. Yet Gutman also cites debates concerning capital
punishment, abortion, and pornography to argue that “reasonable disagreements
over justice can also pose a distinctive problem for political liberalism” to the
extent they may undermine the emergence of an overlapping consensus. Id. at
184.
140. RAWLS, supra note 8, at 161.
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suffused with moral principles and judges draw upon these
principles to resolve disputes about what the law is that arise
when there is a conflict between rules, an ambiguity of a rule,
or a gap in the system of rules. For Dworkin, the law is a
coherent whole and a gapless system.
For this view of the law to be possible, the distinction
between the domain of principled rights, from which judges
draw, and unprincipled policy decisions, the domain of
politicians and legislatures, should be workable. However,
this distinction can be challenged either by showing that
rights discourse includes policy considerations or that
legislative processes include principles. On the one hand,
Duncan Kennedy argues, judicial reasoning in the
elaboration of abstract rights is not immune from ideological
influences, nor sharply distinguishable from open-ended
policy arguments (e.g., balancing tests in resolving disputes
about rights).141 This suggests that the discourse of rights is
not rationally coherent. While indeterminacy is not an
inherent or necessary feature of rights, it may nevertheless
be produced through the legal actor’s work.142 On the other
hand, even if one could conceive of the court as a “forum of
principle,” one may still believe that the legislature is a
forum of principle too and thus deny the advantage ascribed
to judges over politicians.143
The difficulty in making a sharp and stable distinction
between law and politics, adjudication and legislation, and
judge and legislator is symptomatic of the incoherence of the
141. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION {FIN DE SIÈCLE} 124–27,
315–38 (1997).
142. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A Left/Phenomenological Alternative to the
Hart/Kelsen Theory of Legal Interpretation, in LEGAL REASONING: COLLECTED
ESSAYS 153 passim (2008) [hereinafter KENNEDY, A Left/Phenomenological
Alternative]; DUNCAN KENNEDY, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A
Critical Phenomenology, in LEGAL REASONING: COLLECTED ESSAYS, supra, at 11
passim.
143. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 145–46 (1993); JEREMY
WALDRON, Rights and Majorities: Rousseau Revisited, in LIBERAL RIGHTS 392, 419
(1993).
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background scheme of principles itself as it includes
contradictory values. Abstract rights mediate between these
contradictions.144 Kennedy argues that private law
adjudication (as in contract law) exposes two conflicting
orientations between altruism and individualism. The first
favors substantive standards and the second favors formal
rules. This conflict represents a contradiction (both internal
to persons and between persons) between two “irreconcilable
visions of humanity and society, and . . . aspirations for our
common future.”145 These orientations exist in, and emanate
from, the larger political culture. The “[l]egal form fails to
screen out or significantly reduce the range of ideological
conflict” in this culture.146 Rather, legal rules are “complex
compromises” of such a conflict.147 This conflict “cannot be
reduced to disagreement about how to apply some neutral
calculus.”148 If private rights are an incoherent idea, it
follows that public law that presupposes private rights is no
less incoherent.149 Indeed, public law is no less suffused with
contradictory visions of society.150 This is a contradiction
rather than a competition or a tension between principles
that may be resolved by higher principles because they

144. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF.
L. REV. 205, 259 (1979).
145. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685 (1976).
146. Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 229 (1986).
147. KENNEDY, A Left/Phenomenological Alternative, supra note 142, at 168.
148. Kennedy, supra note 145, at 1685.
149. Kennedy, supra note 144, at 360.
150. Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community SelfDetermination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53
IND. L.J. 145, 148, 177–78 (1978) (arguing “that the ‘public purpose’ and
‘delegation’ doctrines, as judicially fashioned and applied, suggest the coexistence
in the judicial mentality of two different, and contradictory, models of localgovernment legitimacy . . . —an economic or ‘public choice’ model and a noneconomic ‘public interest’ or ‘community self-determination’ model”).
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represent opposing ranking of values.151
Against the backdrop of this incoherent framework,
integrity neither guarantees “right answers,” nor necessarily
constrains judges. Judges endorsing integrity can still
advance their preferred values by representing policy
decisions as rights and principles (for instance, judges
valuing liberty will present restrictions on campaign finance
as violating First Amendment freedom of speech rights of
corporations). Other judges who privilege opposing values
may comply with integrity while presenting different policy
decisions as rights and principles (hence, judges valuing
equality rather than liberty would deny that corporations
have freedom of speech rights). Both sides can find some
support for their positions in existing materials and
precedents.152 Integrity then does not circumvent
disagreement over justice (because judges disagree on what
rights people have). Rather, integrity itself becomes a
platform for such disagreement.
In addition, disagreement might arise concerning the
weight ascribed to integrity in its conflict with other ideals.
Disagreement over justice, as Waldron points out, questions
the Dworkinian talk about trade-offs between justice and
integrity or justice and fairness. This is because there are
different ways of weighing between justice and other values.
These depend on one’s conception of justice. This conception
might disagree with Dworkin that integrity or fairness are
ideals equal in weight to justice. In other words,
disagreements over justice breed disagreements over

151. Jeremy Waldron, Did Dworkin Ever Answer the Crits?, in EXPLORING
LAW’S EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 155 passim (Scott
Hershovitz ed., 2006). See also Altman, supra note 146, at 235. Habermas’
attempt to defend Dworkin against the CLS critique has also been criticized by
scholars as unsuccessful. JAMES L. MARSH, UNJUST LEGALITY: A CRITIQUE OF
HABERMAS’S PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 84–88 (2001).
152. KENNEDY, supra note 141, at 97–156. See also Altman, supra note 146, at
223–31.
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legitimacy.153
Dworkin thus underestimates the intractability of
disagreement because he denies value pluralism and
idealizes the law in ways that marginalize the role of political
disagreement and compromises in law.154 In practice, law is
not necessarily coherent, and even if it were that might not
be necessarily morally desirable. Whether one should prefer
coherence to the morally desirable depends on the specific
context.155
B. The Procedural Republic
It follows that the restrictions on the good and the just
by legitimacy become wanting when one considers that
legitimacy is itself highly contestable. If the justificatory
moves, on which these restrictions are based, are a matter of
reasonable disagreement, then the restrictions themselves
lack the non-controversial basis (consensus amongst, and
acceptability to, the reasonable) that makes them
distinguishable from the controversial substance they seek
to circumvent.
The primacy of an impartial procedure as a foundational
organizing governmental theme transforms the liberal state
into, to use Michael Sandel’s phrase, a “procedural republic”
that is not committed to any common good nor to a robust
egalitarian justice.156 This procedural republic entails liberal
constitutionalism in order to maintain its independence of
specific ends while justifying the deployment of the law’s
coercive power. Constitutional rules and principles cannot,
however, control politics because they are no less

153. WALDRON, supra note 112, at 195–98.
154. Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 310, 315
(1992).
155. Id. at 312. See generally Ken Kress, Why No Judge Should Be a
Dworkinian Coherentist, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1375 (1999).
156. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 4 (5th prtg. 1998).
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contentious.157 As Seidman argues, constitutional law
purports to consist of meta-rules that aim at evading political
conflict. Yet it ends up reproducing the conflict at a higher
level, the level of meta-rules themselves. One cannot justify
such rules by referring to the same rules because that will be
redundant; they cannot be justified through their
consequences because this will be circular; nor can they be
justified through a higher level of abstraction since this will
merely lead to an infinite regress.158
Therefore, limits on politics should be recognized as
political and contingent.159 It is not convincing in this context
to engage in question-begging definitional fiats of the
political. Some scholars invoke an overly narrow conception
of politics in order to represent constraints on politics as nonpolitical (e.g., technical or professional or bureaucratic).160
Other scholars consider these constraints as political or
ideological but in a trivial sense because they simultaneously
argue that they are non-controversial and consensual.161
Such empirically-oriented conceptions, however, treat
existing limits on political debates as if they were simply
“given facts” or “natural.” As such, they do not account for
ideological contestation over, or normative justifiability of,
the prevailing “consensus” or “common sense” in a specific
time and place. Lacking a notion of historical change, they
privilege the existing over the possible by presenting the
contingent as stable.

157. See generally Nimer Sultany, The State of Progressive Constitutional
Theory: The Paradox of Constitutional Democracy and the Project of Political
Justification, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 371 (2012) (arguing that the attempt to
legitimate constitutional democracies by reconciling constitutionalism with
democracy has hitherto failed).
158. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE
21–22 (2001).

OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

159. See CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 93 (2000).
160. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court 2005 Term-Foreword:
The Court’s Agenda—And the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8–9 (2006).
161. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 373 (2008).
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Limits on politics neither emanate non-controversially
from reason (or notions of reasonableness), nor can the
domain of the “political” be limited beforehand. Habermas
argues that Rawls’ theory, in contrast to his own “radical
democracy,” is constrained by pre-political rights that are
privileged over democracy and hence constrain democratic
will-formation. Accordingly, Rawlsian political liberalism
“merely promotes the nonviolent preservation of political
stability.”162 However, this alleged difference between Rawls
and Habermas is more perceived than real.163 As Larmore
points out, Rawlsian and Habermasian theories are similarly
based on a moral norm of respect from which an individual
right to equal participation in the formation of collective will
is derived. This norm precedes the process of collective will
formation and does not originate in it. In other words,
democracy presupposes pre-political rights in both
theories.164
C. On Neutrality
In order to exemplify the political and contingent nature
of constraints on politics this section examines liberal
neutrality. There are two faces to neutrality: neutrality as a
justification for political authority and neutrality as a
restriction on governmental action. The point of what follows
is to illustrate that this neutrality is either too abstract to be
useful (egalitarian and progressive) or too concrete to be
universally acceptable. Thus, neutrality does not provide a
refuge from substantive and controversial judgments.
1. Liberal Neutrality
Liberalism is impartial towards competing conceptions
162. Jürgen Habermas, Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason:
Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism, 92 J. PHIL. 109, 128 (1995)
(emphasis in original).
163. Larmore, supra note 58, at 617.
164. See id. at 622. For a similar critique of Habermas, see Frank Michelman,
Democracy and Positive Liberty, BOS. REV., Nov. 1996, passim.

2019]

WHAT GOOD IS ABSTRACTION?

869

of the good, such as religions, but it is not morally neutral or
skeptic.165 Liberalism is neutral towards the good but not visà-vis the principles of justice.166 Liberal theory is neutral
with respect to citizens’ choice between Islamic, Christian,
and Jewish ways of life, but it is not neutral with respect to
a political regime that is based on religion (as in a Christian,
Islamic, or Jewish state). The latter is ruled out in liberal
theory from the company of legitimate liberal democratic
regimes. Unlike a communitarian or a perfectionist state, a
neutral liberal state is “a state which does not justify its
actions on the basis of the intrinsic superiority or inferiority
of conceptions of the good life, and which does not
deliberately attempt to influence people’s judgments of the
value of these different conceptions.”167
Furthermore, Rawls distinguishes between neutralityin-aim (the basic structure and public policy are not to be
intended to favor any conception of the good) and neutralityof-effect (the state should refrain from any policies that
might facilitate and encourage the adoption of a specific
conception of the good).168 Rawlsian liberal theory requires
the first only. The latter, he says, is impractical and is not
required by liberal theory.169 State neutrality towards the

165. DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 203 (denying that liberal neutrality is based
on moral skepticism); JEREMY WALDRON, Legislation and Moral Neutrality, in
LIBERAL RIGHTS, supra note 143, at 143, 156–60 (denying that liberal neutrality
is based on moral skepticism or emotivism; rather neutrality is itself a normative
proposition on which legislatures should not be neutral about). While there may
be different versions of morality, Larmore considers the “more promising
account” to be that which stipulates “that neutral principles are ones that we can
justify without appealing to the controversial views of the good life to which we
happen to be committed.” Larmore, supra note 26, at 341. See also WILL
KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 217 (2d ed.
2002).
166. DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 441.
167. KYMLICKA, supra note 165, at 217. See also ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at
10–11 (discussing neutrality).
168. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 190–95.
169. See WALDRON, supra note 165, at 149 (discussing neutrality in intention
and in consequences and arguing the latter maybe impractical).

870

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

good does not mean that, in effect, some conceptions of the
good would benefit more from the basic structure and will be
able to recruit more adherents than others.170 Obviously, a
majority will benefit more as it will be the dominant culture.
So long as the state is not committed to the majority’s
conception of the good and the basic structure and
“constitutional essentials” are not tilted to serve it, Rawls
would not complain.171
Dworkin presents a similar position. On the one hand,
political authority should be neutral towards citizens’ ways
of life.172 On the other hand, such an approach would not be
neutral in its impact on different ways of life.173 It is the very
fact that there is no neutrality of effect that motivates Will
Kymlicka’s project on defending group rights within
liberalism. Kymlicka seeks to compensate disadvantaged
groups to enable them to obtain genuine equality by allowing
them to maintain their culture and to have access to the
mainstream culture.174
However, this recognition of the lack of neutrality-ofeffect does not go far enough. In fact, reasonable
disagreement persists with respect to supposedly procedural
notions like neutrality-in-aim.175 For example, it is equally
plausible that state neutrality would require banning school
prayers or its opposite outcome, that is, non-interference in
the practice of school prayers. The dispute on the meta-level
would seem to replicate the dispute on the concrete level:
does neutrality require the imposition of outcomes of neutral
democratic procedures or a minimal state allowing private

170. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 193–94.
171. Nor would Martha Nussbaum, supra note 29, at 37.
172. DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 190–92.
173. DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 31, at 154, 282–83.
174. See generally WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL
THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995).
175. SEIDMAN, supra note 158, at 38.
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choices?176 Ultimately, neutrality-in-aim is an incoherent
proposition.
2. Neutrality and Egalitarianism
Neutrality’s contestability is illustrated by the fact that
progressive liberal scholars have attempted to derive
progressive institutional arrangements from neutrality
itself. Thus, Ackerman claims that the demands of equality
and distributive justice follow from the conversational
constraints that neutrality imposes on the justification of the
political order.177 This attempt to derive such a program for
social transformation from thin and abstract grounds is farfetched.178 Fishkin notes that Ackerman vacillates between
strict and loose conceptions of neutrality. The strict
conception is too thin and empty to mandate Ackerman’s
egalitarian objectives, and the loose conception allows
substantive content but is indeterminate and thus fails to
exclusively mandate the egalitarian objectives that
Ackerman’s theory is set to establish.179 For Flathman,
Ackerman’s neutrality would mandate the distributional
goals to which he aspires only at the price of undermining
his own primary assumption: the irreducible plurality of
conceptions of the good. Since Ackerman’s “proposed
allocations necessarily involve rankings of and choices
among goods and hence among conceptions of good” 180 the
suggested “policies are grounded not in Neutrality among
conceptions of good but in a preference for one conception of
good over others.”181 But this conception is inevitably
controversial. Only if it were unanimously accepted in
176. Id.
177. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 30.
178. See, e.g., Richard E. Flathman, Egalitarian Blood and Skeptical Turnips,
93(2) ETHICS 357, 359 (1983).
179. James S. Fishkin, Can There Be a Neutral theory of Justice?, 93 ETHICS
348, 355 (1983).
180. Flathman, supra note 178, at 361.
181. Id.
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society would Ackerman’s proposals be consistent with
neutrality.182
Like Ackerman, Sunstein seeks to derive progressive
conclusions from the abstract notion of neutrality. Sunstein
objects to the conservatives’ conception of neutrality since it
assumes the status quo as the natural baseline.183
Accordingly, one might distinguish between an “activist
neutrality”, that seeks to challenge the status quo and
change it, and a “preservationist neutrality” that seeks to
preserve the status quo and leave it intact.184 Neither of
these kinds of neutrality, however, guarantees progressive
results. Both can be marshaled on behalf of conservative
agendas no less than progressive ones. This is because it
depends on which status quo one wishes to preserve or
challenge. The status quo itself is controversial. If
progressives favor the status quo then they would
presumably want to preserve it through “preservationist
neutrality.” If conservatives dislike the status quo then they
might adopt an “activist neutrality.” Even if both sides
disliked the baseline that is embodied in the status quo, this
would beg the controversial question concerning
alternatives.185 One potential difficulty here is cherry
picking. There are different aspects in the status quo and
progressives or conservatives might like some and dislike
others. Needless to say, progressives and conservatives are
not monolithic camps (as the disagreement between Dworkin
and Owen Fiss, Michelman, and Sunstein on pornography
demonstrates186) and they would disagree on which aspects

182. Id.
183. Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special
Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–13
(1992).
184. These are my phrases, not Sunstein’s.
185. See, e.g., LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF
BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 112 (1996) (discussing the
example of racial equality under the Equal Protection Clause).
186. DWORKIN, supra note 114, at 214–43; OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED:
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of the status quo they dislike and if so which warrants state
intervention. It would seem then that one would be
alternating between different conceptions of neutrality
depending on the context. “Preservationist neutrality” would
be employed when one likes the status quo and therefore
rejects state intervention as paternalistic. “Activist
neutrality” would be employed when one welcomes state
intervention to change the status quo but does not want to
be charged with paternalism.
Such an attempt to redefine neutrality does not expose
conservative conceptions of neutrality as a mistake as much
as expose neutrality as an essentially contested concept even
within the progressive liberal camp given the different
justifications deployed to justify it and the variety of
conclusions that are derived from it.187 Sunstein considers
“preservationist neutrality” a mistaken approach because he
thinks it presupposes a status quo that violates liberal
norms. That is, his neutrality presupposes substantive
liberal values. As previously noted, liberalism may be
neutral towards conceptions of the good but not with respect
to the principles of justice.188 Thus, neutrality may not be
neutral with respect to inequality because it demands
equality. It is less clear, however, which conception it
requires: formal or substantive equality; equality of
opportunity or resources.
Be it as it may, Sunstein’s later theory of constitutional
legitimacy that is invoked in his theory of interpretation and
his justification of judicial review (which he calls
“minimalism”) does not necessarily guarantee progressive
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER passim (1996); Frank
I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument:
The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291 passim (1989).
187. As Waldron notes, neutrality needs to be justified because it is not selfjustifying. Different justifications are likely to lead to different notions of
neutrality. Additionally, the notion of neutrality is necessarily selective since
liberals are neutral with respect to certain questions and not neutral with respect
to others. WALDRON, supra note 165, at 147.
188. DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 203.

874

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

results, as he himself points out.189 Rather than a robust
approach of “activist neutrality,” he urges judges to avoid
certain controversial issues and leave intractable questions
“incompletely theorized.”190
The outcome of these attempts, then, is to expose
neutrality’s incoherence because it destabilizes and redraws
anew the distinction between neutrality and paternalism.
This redrawing, however, does not advance progressive
politics since it is not necessarily mandated by conceptions of
legitimacy deployed by progressive theorists and in fact this
politics may be constrained by these conceptions of
legitimacy. Worse still, arguments advanced by liberals to
advance progressive agendas under neutrality may be used
to advance conservative agendas if and when the particular
context shifts.
Some liberal scholars, like Schauer, are less troubled by
the question of neutrality because they do not have a
normative conception of legitimacy. Nor do they have a Lon
Fuller-like or a Dworkin-like moral conception of the law.
Rather they adopt a sociological conception of legitimacy and
a positivistic understanding of the law. If the law is
instrumental to achieving the community’s moral and
political goals, says Schauer, then it is obviously not neutral.
Principles are always partial with respect to something
irrespective of the level of generality of their phrasing. The
process of lawmaking and constitutional interpretation will
always be value-laden and thus non-neutral. Whether one
supports judicial review or not would depend on the actual
consequences it produces and values it advances.191
Nevertheless, Schauer’s position would reject the goals that
proponents of “activist neutrality” attempt to advance since
189. Cass R. Sunstein, The Minimalist Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
2020 37 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
190. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 39–41 (1999).
191. Frederick Schauer, Neutrality and Judicial Review, 22 L. & PHIL. 217
passim (2003).

2019]

WHAT GOOD IS ABSTRACTION?

875

these would be considered as an abandonment of long-term
deontological values for the sake of short-term policies that
are self-defeating over the long-term.192
However, the problem is not merely factual (that the law
is not neutral), but also normative (whether this lack of
neutrality and its consequences are defensible). Justifying a
legal regulation by sociological acceptance begs the question
because the sociological fact itself needs a justification.193
Justifying legal regulation by reference to pre-commitments
is not compelling either, because these commitments are
abstract and controversial.194
Ultimately, questions like pornography or campaign
finance reform or equal protection, Seidman and Tushnet
remind us, are not about a choice between regulation and its
absence. Rather, they require a choice between different
regulatory regimes.195 Thus, it is misleading to frame the
discussion in binary oppositions like “paternalism v.
neutrality” or “intervention v. non-intervention” or “state
action v. state inaction” or “positive liberty v. negative
liberty.”196 That framing merely reproduces the question in a
different trapping. The main issue is whether there is a
publicly-available, universally-acceptable, theoreticallyprincipled, anti-paternalist position.197 Absent such as

192. Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 1045 passim (2004).
193. Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, in CONSTITUTIONALISM:
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 64, 84 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998).
194. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Precommitment and Disagreement, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 194, at 271, 285,
292.
195. SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 185, at 130.
196. Dworkin frames the discussion of the regulation of pornography in the
terms of a defense of negative liberty against positive liberty. DWORKIN, supra
note 114, at 214–26. Undermining the distinction between negative and positive
liberty, he argues, is the road to tyranny. Id. at 215, 239.
197. For a critique of principled anti-paternalism and a defense of ad hoc
paternalism both in public and private law, see Duncan Kennedy, Distributive
and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to

876

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

position, the invocation of neutrality would obfuscate the
real issues at hand because it would conceal the existence of
paternalism despite its pervasiveness, including in private
law (such as contracts, torts and consumer protection).198
Perhaps, then, a more fruitful line of inquiry would be to
decide which forms of intervention are normatively
defensible.199
III. THE DARK SIDE OF ABSTRACTION
This final section argues that abstraction not only fails
to lead to agreement, it is also likely to lead to undesirable
consequences. In other words, abstraction is not merely
futile; it is also misguided. This is because it mystifies
political conflict and underestimates this conflict’s
intractability, thereby leading to dire consequences for the
prospects of realizing liberal justice. In its search for a
consensual framework, political liberalism marginalizes the

Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 passim
(1982). Kennedy argues that paternalist and distributive motives are pervasive
in contract and tort law but these are masked by efficiency or “inequality of
bargaining power” arguments. Paternalism is not seen as an acceptable motive
for a decision-maker except in exceptional cases of incapacity or lack of will.
However, not all paternalist/interventionist actions or non-actions can be
rationalized under the notion of “capacity.” Kennedy argues that “efficiency” and
“capacity” are manipulable abstract notions under which paternalist motives can
be introduced into the decision-making process. Id. at 587, 644 (discussing
efficiency and capacity). A doctrine like “promissory estoppel” in contracts is an
example of paternalism. Id. at 635. Given the ubiquity of paternalism, Kennedy
concludes, principled anti-paternalism becomes no more than a “defense
mechanism.” Id. at 646. But neutrality is not an option for the decision maker.
Id. at 645, 648–49. Therefore, Kennedy argues for ad hoc paternalism. Id. at 638.
198. Sunstein presents a different position in later writings. E.g., Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 passim (2003). The authors argue that given the findings of
behavioral studies libertarian paternalism should direct citizens’ preferences
towards promoting welfare. Neutrality is not mentioned. For a critique of this
position, see Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism is an Oxymoron, 99 NW.
U. L. REV. 1245 (2005).
199. See, e.g., Robert E. Goodin, Permissible Paternalism: In Defense of the
Nanny State, in THE ESSENTIAL COMMUNITARIAN READER 115, 115–24 (Amitai
Etzioni ed., 1998).
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question of institutional design and thus defers the
advancement of that which progressive-liberal justice
requires.
A. The “Virtues of Abstraction”
Rawls argues that abstraction is not merely a question
of avoiding disagreement but it also provides a clarification
device for the nature of disagreement. Rawls writes:
The work of abstraction . . . is not gratuitous: not abstraction for
abstraction’s sake. Rather, it is a way of continuing public
discussion when shared understandings of lesser generality have
broken down. We should be prepared to find that the deeper the
conflict, the higher the level of abstraction to which we must ascend
to get a clear and uncluttered view of its roots. 200

However, the preceding discussion points to a different
conclusion. It is not merely that abstraction as a
disagreement-avoidance-minimization-postponement device
fails. It also conceals the intractable nature of political
disagreements.201 By presenting a state of affairs regarding
the availability of “a common stock of concepts and norms
which all may employ and to which all may appeal,”202 liberal
political
rhetoric
falsely
suggests
that
political
disagreements can be rationally settled. This political
rhetoric conceals the depth of value conflicts by presenting
them as no more than conceptual confusions or interpretive
mistakes and hence deceptive appearances.203
The “higher the level of abstraction . . . we . . . ascend to”
(to use Rawls’ phrase), the emptier the agreement it leads to.
The emptier this agreement, the more illusory its nature,
and the more incapable is this abstraction in providing us
with a “clear view” of the “roots” of political and social
200. RAWLS, supra note 17, at 45–46.
201. MACINTYRE, supra note 119, at 253 (emphasis in original).
202. Id. at 252.
203. Martha Minow & Joseph William Singer, In Favor of Foxes: Pluralism as
Fact and Aid to the Pursuit of Justice, 90 B.U. L. REV. 903, 916 (2010).
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conflicts. Rather than discussing the “roots” of conflict,
political discussions are diverted into an abstract debate.
Neither the abstract debate is likely to be resolved, nor does
it dictate specific resolutions to the concrete debates that are
embedded in the specific social, political, and historical
context.
The method of abstraction abstracts the legitimacy of
political and legal ordering from controversial conceptions of
the good and reasonable disagreements about justice. Thus,
it relegates much of the intractable, controversial issues to
the non-political sphere. By doing so, it disconnects some of
the political disagreements from their wellspring. Many of
the political discussions become more technical or legalistic
versions of the real issues lurking behind the views taken by
the contestants. Indeed, abstraction may lead to highlyspecialized and obscure discussions.204 These discussions
mystify the issues at hand.205 Disagreements might be
misrepresented by participants or mistaken by observers to
what they are not, or even disconnected entirely from the
real issues at hand.
Dworkin argues that abstraction is beneficial because it
makes debates more civilized and less heated and increases
the potential for their resolution.206 However, the point here
is not whether intractable disagreement is heated or not,
expressed in civilized ways or not. What is at stake is not the
form of disagreement, rather, the main question at hand is
the intractability and the persistence of this disagreement
(with respect to legitimacy too). The method of abstraction
presents a false picture of agreement over fundamental
issues that regulate the political sphere. It represents
legitimacy as a solid rock, an island of consensus, that is

204. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
80 (1999).
205. GUY ROBINSON, PHILOSOPHY AND MYSTIFICATION: A REFLECTION
NONESENSE AND CLARITY 5–7 (2003); Sultany, supra note 157, at 454–55.
206. DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 31, at 240.
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acceptable to anyone who is reasonable and within which
other disagreements can be managed and moderated.
The history of moral and philosophical debates does not
lend credence to the hope that abstract questions are likely
to be more resolvable.207 These are no less intractable than
the ethical questions that political liberalism seeks to set
aside. One reason for the irresolvability of abstract moral
questions is the absence of “consensus with regard to moral
principles from which answers to contested moral questions
might actually be derived.”208
A possible objection to this argument may focus on the
advantage of “narrowing the differences” as opposed to
irresolvability. If there is a chance that a sizable fraction of
the citizenry would find, say, Rawls’ principle of legitimacy
acceptable and endorse it, would not that narrow down the
differences amongst them? And hence would it not represent
a moral or a practical gain that would justify the deployment
of the method of abstraction?
This objection conflates two meanings of abstraction:
abstraction-as-common-ground
and
abstraction-asemptiness. Even if the common ground were achieved it
would turn out to be an empty or incoherent common ground
and as such it does not necessarily reduce disagreement. On
the one hand, the answers provided to abstract questions do
not necessarily dictate specific answers to the controversies
arising in concrete contexts. On the other hand, moral,
philosophical and legal discourses are indeterminate and can
be deployed by holders of competing positions to justify their
views in concrete cases.209
Even if there were an effect of narrowing the differences
this cannot confidently be attributed to normative
endorsement as it may emanate from socialization and

207. POSNER, supra note 204, at 50.
208. Id. at 63.
209. Id. at 53; see also id. at 268.
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sociological acceptance of authority. Moreover, narrowing
the differences is a descriptive question that has a normative
dimension. Disagreement exists also with respect to the
desirability of narrowing the differences. And how will we
narrow the differences between those who do not perceive
narrowing the differences as a gain and those who do?
B. Marginalizing Institutional Design
Liberal scholars justify the gap between progressive
liberal ambitions to justice and progressive liberal
commitments to legitimacy (the proceduralization via
abstraction) by virtue of the recognition of reasonable
disagreement. This recognition leads to justifying specific
notions of legitimacy and rationalizing certain institutional
arrangements that fall short of what liberal justice requires.
These notions of legitimacy remain controversial no matter
how thinly conceived. Therefore, it is not only disagreement
that is concealed but also politics is misconceived and
watered down. This is because abstraction has also the effect
of marginalizing the project of institutional design.
Progressive liberalism cannot be evaluated without
taking into account both its claims to justice and its
commitments to legitimacy. William Connolly writes:
Current liberalism cannot be defined merely through its
commitment to freedom, rights, dissent, and justice. It must be
understood, as well, through the institutional arrangements it
endorses. Its unity grows out of the congruence between these ideals
and their institutional supports. If the first principle of liberalism
is liberty, the second is practicality. Liberal practicality involves the
wish to support policies which appear attainable within the current
order . . .210

Indeed, the move to political liberalism, and even more so to
legitimacy, includes some notion of practicality. Rawls
writes:

210. WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, The Dilemma of Legitimacy, in POLITICS
AMBIGUITY 72, 83 (1987).

AND
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[T]he aim of justice as fairness as a political conception is practical,
and not metaphysical or epistemological. That is, it presents itself
not as a conception of justice that is true, but one that can serve as
a basis of informed and willing political agreement between citizens
viewed as free and equal persons.211

However, the retreat to legitimacy that embodies this notion
of practicality leaves political liberalism suspended between
a reality it simultaneously condemns and accepts. Indeed,
“principled liberalism is neither at home in the civilization of
productivity nor prepared to challenge its hegemony.”212 It
does not endorse the welfare capitalist economy (because it
is unjust), yet it does not reject it either (because it is
legitimate), nor does it insist on the required measures to
overcome these unjust conditions. Indeed, “liberal
egalitarianism’s institutional commitments have not kept
pace with its theoretical commitments. This has led to a
tension, perhaps even a crisis, in the politics of liberal
egalitarianism.”213
This crisis is likely to endure because liberal
egalitarianism, for historical and theoretical reasons, cannot
keep pace with its theoretical commitments. The recognition
of the legitimacy of existing arrangements would make sense
from the perspective of progressive liberal ideals of justice if
these arrangements were likely to lead to the approximation
of justice.214 That is, if liberal conceptions of legitimacy

211. Rawls, supra note 115, at 230.
212. CONNOLLY, supra note 210, at 84.
213. KYMLICKA, supra note 165, at 91.
214. For instance, Dworkin calls the United States “a decent working
democracy” even though unjust conditions persist. He writes: “In a decent
working democracy, like the United States, the democratic conditions set out in
the Constitution are sufficiently met in practice so that there is no unfairness in
allowing national and local legislatures the powers they have under standing
arrangements.” DWORKIN, supra note 114, at 32. Elsewhere, in explicating his
theory of justice, he writes: “The prosperous democracies are very far from
providing even a decent minimal life for everyone . . . .” DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN
VIRTUE, supra note 31, at 3. Though unjust, the solution may not require any
radical institutional changes: “The distributional schemes now in place in the
United States and Britain, haphazard and patchwork though they are, could
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provided members of society with the required resources and
institutional prescriptions for advancing the legitimate
towards the just. As far as one can draw lessons from the last
decades of United States history, there is no progress
towards liberal justice. The socio-political developments
since, say, the writing of A Theory of Justice have been
contrary to Rawls’ ambitions.215 The rise in conservative
forces, including in the Supreme Court, have advanced neoliberal and anti-egalitarian policies that only increased social
and economic inequalities.216
In his recent work, economist Thomas Piketty illustrates
that there is an overall historical tendency in capitalist
societies toward increasing inequality in wealth and
income.217 He stresses that the history of inequality is

plainly be improved by a more just tax system, for example, and any
redistribution towards those at the bottom, that would not impose fresh liberty
deficits. Neither Britain nor the United States (nor, I believe, any other country)
has yet achieved a defensible scheme of distribution.” Id. at 169. He adds, “we
have not achieved, or even approached, a defensible distribution for us. We have
not done even what we technically can to ameliorate distributional inequality;
our failures have been of will, imagination, and, mainly, justice.” Id. at 172–73.
215. Raymond Geuss, Neither History Nor Praxis, 11 EUR. REV. 281, 286
(2003).
216. See, e.g., ELIZABETH KNEEBONE ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., The Re-Emergence
of Concentrated Poverty: Metropolitan Trends in the 2000s passim (2011); Thomas
Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998,
118 Q. J. ECON. 1 passim (2003); Alan Cowell, In Britain, Minding the Income
Gap, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/world
/europe/26iht-letter26.html (“The figures recorded the greatest imbalance in the
United States, where a notional one-tenth of 1 percent of the population was
listed as controlling 7.5 percent of America’s riches. The corresponding figure for
the top 0.1 percent of Britons—roughly 60,000 people—was 5 percent of the
country’s wealth, on a par with the nouveau riche and mineral rich in South
Africa, but twice the level in France and other European nations, like Sweden,
that pride themselves on a degree of virtuous égalité.”); Alexander Stille, The
Paradox of the New Elite, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/
2011/10/23/opinion/sunday/social-inequality-and-the-new-elite.html (noting that
the United States became more inclusive by expanding equal rights to different
groups and at the same time more tolerant of economic stratification becoming
“one of the most unequal democracies in the world”).
217. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 27 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2014).
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“deeply political” and “is shaped by the way economic, social,
and political actors view what is just and what is not, as well
as by the relative power of those actors and the collective
choices that result.”218 He maintains that the sustainability
of “extreme inequality” depends not only on repressive
methods but also on “the effectiveness of the apparatus of
justification.”219
It becomes pertinent then to examine how the “ought”
can be realized in reality under such adverse conditions
because ignoring them would be detrimental to the theory’s
egalitarian objectives.220 Instead, liberal egalitarians have
been either concerned with ideal theories of justice that
lacked institutional prescriptions for their implementation,
or that their institutional prescriptions (as a matter of
justice) were too modest to achieve what their own ideals
imply (given their focus on redistribution of income through
tax and transfer schemes within the welfare state) and thus
do not change the conditions that undermine the attainment
of these very liberal ideals.221 Something similar can be said
about Habermas’ attempt to tame the economy:222 “taming
colonization [of the life-world] is insufficient if the inequality
in wealth and income within the economic sphere is left
untouched.”223
The problem is not merely that liberal egalitarianism is
either ideal or modest. Rather, the primary difficulty lies in
the fact that the liberal theoretical edifice—no matter how
ambitious as a matter of justice—maintains a gap between
the “is” and the “ought.” In this move, justice recedes to a
mere “ought,” a regulative idea, an external evaluative
standard, a suspended ideal, or a delayed good, rather than
218. Id. at 20.
219. Id. at 264.
220. HABERMAS, supra note 33, at 64–65.
221. KYMLICKA, supra note 165, at 91.
222. HABERMAS, supra note 33, at 410.
223. MARSH, supra note 151, at 7.
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an immanent potentiality in existing forms of life that can be
realized in the world.
In fact, it is the very move to legitimacy that deflects
liberal egalitarian attention from discussions over the
required institutional changes, and from analyzing the
historical conditions under which these changes can be
realized. Consequently, the practicality that underpins the
method of abstraction is self-defeating because abstraction is
devoid of “practical utility.”224 Indeed, “[i]n the making of
public policy, abstract theory is a good with very little cash
value.”225 There is an evident tension between outlining an
institutional program that a political regime committed to
justice should pursue and thin conceptions of legitimacy that
seek the widest acceptability possible. The thinner—the
more “political,” the more abstract, and the more
proceduralist—progressive liberalism becomes, the less it is
able to secure or mandate its own ambitions to justice. The
thinner it becomes, the more it privileges the existing over
the possible.
In light of this, the institutional commitments that
follow from the endorsement of welfare-state capitalism or
neo-liberalism as legitimate are more wanting. The problem
with political liberalism is threefold. First, it is unclear how
the move to legitimacy would bring progressive ideals to
fruition given the thinness of the legitimacy standards.
Second, abstract liberal legitimacy is malleable to antiegalitarian corruptions and neo-liberal manipulations.
Third, progressive liberals accept these corruptions and
manipulations as legitimate. Their own theories of liberal
legitimacy have a legitimation effect on outcomes they
oppose.

224. Kukathas, supra note 1, at 215, 219.
225. Id. at 223.
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IV. CONCLUSION
At this historical juncture of fast-paced political, social,
and legal change, this Article is an initial step toward a
critical reflection on leading liberal frameworks that
theoretically respond to the world of events and intervene in
it. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to outline an
alternative to political liberalism,226 it puts forth an internal
critique of inherited frameworks. This is a crucial step
toward exposing the need for alternatives given the
increasing signs of atrophy in the existing social and political
order. It may be satisfying to reconstruct liberal theories to
defend more radical conclusions than their original authors
would have allowed.227 It remains instructive, however, that
these leading theorists were reticent in the first place as if
obstructed by a straitjacket of their own making. By critically
engaging the theoretical framework to which major liberal
authors contribute, this Article probes whether this
framework is adequate. Ignoring the instability and
inadequacy of the framework, liberal egalitarians often
reduce the question to one of disagreement about the means
to address poverty and inequality, such as the justiciability
of social and economic rights.228 Yet it is crucial to inquire
whether the framework itself is deficient and thus should be
transformed or transcended.
Central to this liberal theoretical framework is a method
of abstraction in which progressive liberals retreat from their
initial egalitarian commitments to a more limited stipulation
of the necessary background conditions for the deployment of
the state’s coercive power under conditions of disagreement
over justice. This method is untenable and its consequences

226. See, e.g., TONY SMITH, BEYOND LIBERAL EGALITARIANISM: MARX
NORMATIVE SOCIAL THEORY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2017).
227. See,
e.g., WILLIAM
SOCIALIST (2017).
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228. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Poverty in Liberalism: A Comment on the
Constitutional Essentials, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1001, 1019 (2012).
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are normatively objectionable from a progressive (liberal
egalitarian) standpoint. It neither secures an acceptable
foundation for the legal-political order that escapes the
disagreement that besets liberal justice, nor is it capable of
securing its egalitarian ambitions. The question, then, is
whether the thinning out process in the search for liberal
legitimacy is a worthwhile progressive project. The legacy of
political liberalism is that legitimacy is not only different
from justice, but it also defers justice and legitimates
injustice.
Liberal legitimacy is different from liberal justice
because it requires from the political community less than
what justice requires. In fact, legitimacy presupposes the
absence of justice and the inability to attain it, given
reasonable disagreement. Liberal legitimacy is supposed to
include some of the requirements of liberal justice (indeed,
this inclusion makes it a normative conception of legitimacy
that identifies a “reasonably just” political regime). Yet the
existence of legitimacy is the testimony for the absence of
justice because a gap between legitimacy and justice exists
nonetheless.
Liberal legitimacy defers liberal justice. First, its
institutional commitments constrain the advancement of
justice and in fact may hinder its attainment. Second, its
abstract formulations cannot secure the requirements of
justice. Indeed, liberal legitimacy cannot secure the
conditions for its own existence (since reasonable
disagreement concerning legitimacy itself persists), let alone
for the existence of liberal justice. Finally, its abstract,
procedural, “political” concepts have the effect of concealing
the depth of disagreements in society and hence may
preclude an understanding of the conditions required for
achieving justice.
Last but not least, liberal legitimacy legitimates the very
injustice that liberal justice condemns. This is because
political liberalism accepts as legitimate forms of political
economy (e.g., welfare-state capitalism and neo-liberalism)
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that contravene liberal egalitarianism. Despite the injustice
that these political economies produce, political liberalism
allows that they can be the product of acceptable procedures,
acceptable institutions, and acceptable forms of reasoning
that were envisaged by political liberalism itself. While
political liberalism criticizes the injustice of these practices,
its proponents have produced arguments and justifications
that diminish the sense of urgency in tackling the gravely
unjust conditions these political economies create. No matter
how loudly political liberalism protests inequality, it has
little grounds to object to the deployment of the state’s
coercive power to advance anti-egalitarian policies. This is
because it lends the unjust state the stamp of normative
acceptability.

